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CROSS PURPOSES
Absence of remedy is absence of right. Defect of remedy is defect of




Religious symbols and imagery mark the American public
landscape. Biblical statuary, religious inscriptions, crosses, creches, and
menorahs occupy positions of prominence in parks, civic buildings, and
2
public squares across the nation. Implicating both the First
Amendment's prohibition against the establishment of religion as well as
its guarantee of expressive freedom, these symbols have given rise to a
vast and complicated jurisprudence that, in certain of its aspects, has
been justly criticized as conflicting and incoherent.3 The confusion is not
surprising, given the complexity of the constitutional calculus. An array
of factors enters the analysis, including the size, location, and historical
context of the display at issue, its private or public sponsorship, and the
extent of access to the public space by those seeking to exhibit other
expressive symbols.
While application of these factors often produces erratic results, the
courts have spoken with relative clarity in at least one area: the
constitutionality of permanent religious displays on public land. The rule
is increasingly clear that government may not permit its parkland and
public spaces to be used as permanent platforms for symbolic religious
expression.4  But while the courts have developed a substantial
jurisprudence that carefully addresses the question of constitutional
liability in this context, there is very little authority addressing the more
difficult and equally important remedial questions raised by such
displays. It is not difficult to conclude that a solitary, towering Latin
cross at the center of a public park violates constitutional norms: one can
hardly imagine a more potent representation of religious endorsement.5
It is much more difficult, however, to determine what must be done to
correct the violation. May the cross and the land beneath it be sold rather
than requiring that the display be removed from public property? If so,
does it matter how much land attends the transfer? May government sell
the cross and underlying property on condition that the symbol be
preserved?
1. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 83-84 (1960).
2. See infra notes 121-24.
3. See, e.g., Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 163 (5th Cir. 1991) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting) ("confusion reigns" in Establishment Clause doctrine addressing temporary religious
displays on public land; leading Supreme Court authority "is a confusing matrix composed largely of
minority opinions that reach contradictory results and focus on the minutiae of scenic design and
physical arrangement").
4. See infra notes 109-41 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 121.
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The absence of authority addressing such questions reflects the fact
that, until relatively recently, unconstitutional displays were simply
removed from public land in the typical case-a remedy that directly
resolved the violation without need for elaborate judicial analysis. Over
the last decade, however, government defendants have proposed
increasingly complex remedies to avert the removal of unconstitutional
displays, raising difficult questions that the federal courts have yet to
answer satisfactorily.
This Article examines the broad range of remedial issues that
increasingly arise in cases involving impermissible religious displays on
public land. It argues that many of the newly proposed remedies fail to
affirm the constitutional values at issue, and that the limited existing
jurisprudence has not rigorously and consistently subjected the proposals
to appropriate constitutional scrutiny. As a result, the doctrine is at risk
of being trivialized despite the apparent victories, thus eroding rather
than bolstering the force and dignity of the endorsement prohibition.
The Article is divided into three sections. Part I, an analytic
preface, discusses the prevailing "perception of endorsement" test used
to assess whether government action has the effect of advancing religion
in violation of the Establishment Clause. The discussion focuses on the
central analytic construct of the "objective observer," endowed with
essentially perfect factual information, who is charged under the
endorsement test with the task of assessing the perceived effect of
government conduct. Part H reviews the application of the test to the
question whether permanent religious displays on public land are
constitutionally permissible. As set forth in Part II, courts have
consistently held that the permanent integration of religious imagery with
the physical presence of government itself violates the endorsement
prohibition.
Part III, the principal focus of the Article, begins with the premise
that the objective observer not only must discern the constitutional
violation but also must arbitrate its remedy. Framing the remedial
analysis from the vantage of an essentially omniscient observer yields
important insights regarding the scope and rigor of the inquiry. Most
generally, the analysis so framed requires that any remedial proposal
withstand close scrutiny to assure that it does not subtly perpetuate
government's established religious preference. To survive such review,
a remedy must satisfy the interrelated imperatives of physical separation
and expressive neutrality. This proposed two-part inquiry requires that
remedial measures (1) achieve evident and substantial physical
separation between government and impermissible religious displays (2)
through means that the objective observer would perceive as strictly
neutral with respect to the religious expression at issue. These dual
principles are then applied across an array of remedial proposals
advanced in recent cases concerning endorsed religious speech.
[Vol. 82:2
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Throughout the discussion, the remedial implications of the proposed
two-part inquiry are contrasted with the significantly less demanding
requirements imposed by several of the courts that have addressed the
same questions.
The Article argues in conclusion that the considerable divergence
between the enforcement of rights and remedies in this area diminishes
the vitality and dignity of the constitutional doctrine. Moreover, by
giving rise to the appearance that litigation challenging government's
endorsement of symbolic religious expression is a technical exercise with
trivial consequences, constitutional adjudication in this context threatens
to impair its own integrity as well.
I. ENDORSEMENT AND THE OMNISCIENT OBSERVER
A. The Endorsement Standard
In 1971 the Supreme Court adopted the tripartite Lemon test to
evaluate claims arising under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.6  Under Lemon,
government conduct (1) must have a secular purpose, (2) must not have
the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3) must
not lead to excessive entanglement between religion and government.
7
The test has inspired fierce and voluminous criticism 8 arising largely
from the view that the standard is unmanageably fact-bound 9 and also-
in the view of proponents of a less separationist Establishment Clause
jurisprudence-that it reflects an undue hostility toward religion in the
public sphere.10
While never expressly repudiating Lemon,"l an increasingly
conservative Supreme Court has relaxed the standard over time and now
applies a markedly different variant of the original formulation. 12 In
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, the Court
fundamentally altered the focus of the Lemon test by introducing the
6. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
7. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
8. Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV.
463, 468-69 (1994) [hereinafter Gey 1] ("[The Lemon test] is possibly the most maligned constitu-
tional standard the Court has ever produced.").
9. E.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Gey I, supra note 8, at 469; Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its
Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 499, 503 (2002); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions,
and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the 'No Endorsement' Test, 86 MICH. L. REV.
266, 269 (1987).
10. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CIII. L. REV.
115, 116 (1992); Choper, supra note 9, at 501-03.
11. Justice Scalia has famously derided the standard as "some ghoul in a late-night horror
movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and bur-
ied ...." Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring).
12. Gey I, supra note 8, at 467; see Choper, supra note 9, at 499.
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concept of endorsement as the touchstone of the inquiry.13 By collapsing
Lemon's first two prongs into the single query whether a "challenged
governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of 'endorsing'
religion," the Court exchanged Lemon's original condemnation of all
non-secular purposes for a prohibition against the smaller universe of
purposes which affirmatively endorse religion.' 4  Likewise, the Court
replaced Lemon's original prohibition of effects which advance religion
with a proscription against its evident endorsement-a subset of the
former which, rather than concerning itself with any direct assistance to
religion, more narrowly targets assistance in the form of apparent
sanction. 15  Finally, the Court "dispense[d] with the 'entanglement'
prong"' 6 altogether and now subsumes that inquiry into its analysis of the
endorsing effect of certain forms of government aid.' 7 While the Court
occasionally employs alternative standards to assess the establishment
prohibition, 18  the endorsement test indisputably governs the
constitutionality of symbolic religious expression on public land.19
In embracing the endorsement principle in Allegheny, the Court
adopted a position that Justice O'Connor had advanced separately in
prior opinions. O'Connor argued that endorsement would clarify much
of Lemon's analytic confusion while focusing the Establishment Clause
inquiry on the core values that the provision should be understood to
promote.20 In O'Connor's view, "[tihe Establishment Clause prohibits
government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a
person's standing in the political community.",21 A prohibition against
endorsement promotes this fundamental objective because endorsement
"sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
13. 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989).
14. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592.
15. Gey L supra note 8, at 478 ("Even substantial state support for religion is permissible
under Justice O'Connor's standard if the state cleverly packages the support, either by including
nonreligious beneficiaries in the same program that benefits religious individuals or by providing a
homogenizing context that subsumes the religious message within a general statement of support for
social pluralism.").
16. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).
17. Tenafly Eruv Ass 'n, Inc., 309 F.3d at 174 n.36; see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-
33 (1997); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807-08 (2000); Moore v. City of Van, 238 F. Supp. 2d
837, 850 n.22 (E.D. Tex. 2003).
18. See, e.g., Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and the Estab-
lishment Clause, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 27, 48-58 (2002); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Viii. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
19. DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 411 (2d Cir. 2001); see, e.g.,
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1174, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2321-22 (2004)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); cf Steven G. Gey, When Is Religious Speech Not "Free Speech"?, 2000
U. ILL. L. REv. 379, 391 n.58, 444 (2000) [hereinafter Gey II].
20. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
21. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687.
(Vol. 82:2
CROSS PURPOSES
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
,,22community.
With respect to assessing whether state conduct has the effect of
religious endorsement-the second prong of the modified Lemon
analysis-the Allegheny Court embraced the "perception of
endorsement" approach first articulated by Justice O'Connor in Lynch v.
Donnelly.23 Under Justice O'Connor's formulation, the Court must ask
"whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under
review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. 24 The
test requires the Court to focus on the perception of an objective observer
who possesses "reasonable as opposed to heightened (or diminished)
sensitivity" 25 and who is "deemed more informed than the casual
passerby., 26 This determination is "not entirely a question of fact" 27 but
is instead "a legal question to be answered on the basis of judicial
interpretation of social facts.
28
The Court illustrated the endorsement analysis in Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe.29 In Santa Fe, the Court considered
a policy that permitted students "to deliver a brief invocation and/or
message ...during the pre-game ceremonies of home varsity football
games to solemnize the event ... . 0 Although the policy did not
explicitly endorse religious messages, the Court concluded that "the
actual or perceived endorsement of [religion] ... is established by factors
beyond just the text of the policy."3' The Court noted that it must
ascertain "whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text,
legislative history, and implementation of the [policy], would perceive it
as a state endorsement" of religion, 32 and stressed that the inquiry
presumed knowledge of "the history and context of the community and
forum."
33
The "perception of endorsement" test thus posits an exceedingly
well-informed observer who is knowledgeable of the "history and
22. Id. at 688.
23. Id. at 690.
24. Id.
25. Idleman, supra note 18, at 26.
26. Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
27. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
28. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694. Cases decided under analogous state constitutional provisions
similarly turn on whether a challenged religious display creates an appearance of governmental
endorsement or preference. The No Preference Clause of the California Constitution, for example,
bans actual as well as apparent religious preference. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; see, e.g., Hewitt v.
Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561, 1567 (9th Cir. 1991); Carpenter v. City of San Francisco, 93 F.3d 627, 629
(9th Cir. 1996).
29. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
30. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 298.
31. Id. at 307.
32. Id. at 308 (internal quotation omitted).
33. Id. at 317 (internal quotation omitted).
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implementation" of challenged government conduct as well as the
"history and context of the community and forum" to which that conduct
relates-i.e., virtually every relevant factual consideration bearing on
whether religious expression enjoys the apparent endorsement of
government.34  Justice O'Connor asserts that this observer is
"reasonable" in the sense that he or she reflects, as in tort law, "'a
personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined
by the [collective] social judgment.' ' '35 However, because "reasonable
behavior" reflects the application of reasonable judgment to a reasonable
understanding of the relevant facts, the assertion is only half right. While
O'Connor's observer possesses reasonable sensibilities, he or she brings
that judgment to bear on essentially perfect factual information that far
exceeds any collective social norm. 36 The constructed persona is, in all
relevant respects, factually omniscient.
B. Criticism and Analysis of the Standard
Justice O'Connor's modification of Lemon has inspired criticism
from a number of quarters. Various commentators have challenged the
endorsement standard as both a retreat from and a step beyond the proper
degree of separation between government and religion envisioned by the
Establishment Clause. 37 Others, while accepting the concept of actual or
perceived endorsement as an appropriate articulation of the constitutional
prohibition, argue that Justice O'Connor's particular formulation is
flawed.38 While a survey of the critical literature is beyond the scope of
this Article, a brief assessment of the most serious objections will place
in sharper relief the test's remedial implications.
The primary objection to Justice O'Connor's standard, advanced by
a number of scholars and embraced to some degree by several Justices of
the Supreme Court, is that the test is too protective of separationist
interests by wrongly defining the constitutional right in terms of an
intangible "expressive" injury subjectively experienced by an idealized
observer.39 This inquiry, they argue, is flawed in two respects: it injects
34. See also Pinette, 515 U.S. at 778 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (court must assess endorsing
effect of government policy in light of its "history and administration").
35. Id. at 780 (quoting W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984)).
36. In disclaiming Justice Stevens' characterization of the objective observer as "ultrareason-
able," O'Connor points to only one body of information with which the observer is unfamiliar: "the
vagaries of this Court's First Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 781.
37. Compare, e.g., Gey I, supra note 8, at 478 with Choper, supra note 9, passim.
38. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 9, at 525-26. A competing critique, advanced by separation-
ists, argues that the endorsement test improperly dilutes the values underpinning the Establishment
Clause by superseding the principle of strict neutrality implied by the original Lemon formulation.
See Gey L supra note 8, at 478. Unlike the critique discussed below, this objection has no propo-
nents on the Supreme Court and plays essentially no role in the current judicial debate regarding the
appropriate scope of the Establishment Clause prohibition.
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too much subjectivity into the judicial analysis 40 while improperly
thwarting the broader community's "felt need" to express religious
conviction in circumstances where no concrete injury is inflicted. 41 They
argue that the standard instead should focus on whether government
conduct coerces participation in or support for religious activity, which
can be measured without reference to the subjective perceptions of an
idealized observer.42 These arguments have been elaborated by several
scholars and jurists.
43
1. The Question of Subjectivity
Justice O'Connor's "perception of endorsement" test indisputably
injects a degree of subjectivity into the analysis of constitutional injury.
There is considerable debate, however, over the extent to which the
standard is indeterminate. The objection is met in part by O'Connor's
particular formulation of the test, which posits an objective observer who
bases his or her judgment on essentially all relevant factual
considerations." In structuring the analysis in this manner, the test links
the perception of the observer to a full factual record and thus diminishes
the discretion with which the test can be applied.45 Indeed, the artifice of
the objective observer is essentially read out of the analysis insofar as the
inquiry turns on the court's own assessment of the reasonable inferences
drawn from the totality of circumstances.46 The court expresses its own
perception of endorsement-in the guise of an idealized observer-based
upon the complete record.47  The specter of a constitutional standard
turning on the irreconcilable sense perceptions of competing reasonable
observers, whose judgments arise from widely divergent knowledge and
experience, is accordingly unfounded-provided that the court in fact
weighs the entire record rather than subjectively isolating some subset of
40. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 9, at 292-93.
41. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 9, at 526-27.
42. See id. at 504; Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986).
43. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Choper, supra note 9, passim; cf. McConnell, supra note 10, at 157-66.
44. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text; see, e.g., ACLU v. City of Plattsmouth,
358 F.3d 1020, 1040 (8th Cir. 2004) (discussing observer's detailed knowledge of factual and his-
torical record, court notes that "[tihis is a well informed observer indeed"), reh'g granted and opin-
ion vacated, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 6636 (8th Cir. Apr. 6, 2004).
45. In criticizing the construct of the objective observer, Professor Smith argues that "a purely
fictitious character will perceive precisely as much, and only as much, as its author wants it to per-
ceive; and there is no empirical touchstone or outside referent upon which a critic could rely to show
that the author was wrong." Smith, supra note 9, at 292. An observer as knowledgeable as the one
posited by Justice O'Connor, however, does in fact have an empirical touchstone-the full record.
46. Neil R. Feigenson, Political Standing and Governmental Endorsement of Religion: An
Alternative to Current Establishment Clause Doctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 53, 88 (1990).
47. Id. at 90 ("[Tjhe 'objective' or 'reasonable' observer is, in the final analysis, the judici-
ary.").
48. See Smith, supra note 9, at 292.
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evidence that a highly informed (but not entirely informed) observer
purportedly might apprehend .
The test articulated by Justice O'Connor nonetheless embeds within
it a potentially significant degree of subjectivity, not because the
standard employs an idealized observer but because the observer (in
reality, the fully-informed court itself) is asked to discern actual or
apparent "endorsement"-a concept that, depending on its definition,
may inject an irreducible degree of discretion into the analysis. If the
court construes the term to mean only a purposeful message of official
sanction, both the purpose and effects inquiry collapse into the single
question whether an intentional endorsing message has been made and
thus can be perceived. This analysis is not appreciably more or less
determinate than any other inquiry into legislative purpose. ° While not
notable for its subjectivity,51 however, this understanding of endorsement
would significantly restrict the reach of the constitutional prohibition in
view of the fact that legislatures infrequently act with such demonstrable
intent in matters of religion.52 In turn, the construction would fail to
address the concerns regarding political standing that undergird the test
itself.5 3  For this reason, Justice O'Connor has rejected this narrow
understanding of endorsement and directed that the constitutional inquiry
look beyond the professed legislative rationale to determine not merely
its sincerity 54 but also the communicative impact of the resulting
governmental action, irrespective of intent.
55
In applying this broader standard, however, it is unclear whether the
idealized observer should consider the communicative impact of
government action entirely without regard to evidence of legislative
intent or instead should assess such evidence as part of its broader effects
inquiry. O'Connor's formulation of the objective observer implies the
latter, since the observer is deemed aware of the text, legislative history,
and implementation of the statute.56 But if such evidence is probative of
49. Cf Choper, supra note 9, at 512-13 (comparing lower court decisions that impute to the
objective observer widely divergent levels of factual knowledge).
50. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56-60; cf Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971)
("[l]t is extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motiva-
tions, that lie behind a legislative enactment."); Feigenson, supra note 46, at 84-85.
51. Cf McConnell, supra note 10, at 143 ("[T]he argument about legislative purpose is one of
the most important questions cutting across the fields of constitutional law. It affects everything
from the Equal Protection Clause to the Commerce Clause to the Bill of Attainder Clause.").
52. Cf Pinette, 515 U.S. at 791-92 (Souter, J., concurring).
53. Smith explains: "a focus ... upon legislative intent.., diverges from the purpose which
Justice O'Connor attributes to the 'no endorsement' test. . . . If [political alienation) is the purpose
of the test ... then the pertinent fact controlling the application of the test should [not] be . . . the
perhaps indiscernible intent of government officials .... [T]he controlling standard, rather, should
be the actual perceptions of real citizens." Smith, supra note 9, at 294.
54. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75.
55. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Pinette, 515 U.S. at 777 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
56. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308.
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the endorsing effect of government action, and if the observer is truly as
well informed as O'Connor implies, the effects and purpose inquiries
will still merge, as discussed above,5 7  and O'Connor's effort to
differentiate between purposeful and apparent endorsement
disintegrates-at least in those circumstances where legislative intent is
discernible.
To make sense of an independent effects inquiry performed by an
objective observer, then, the court must focus predominantly on facts
that, considered without regard to direct evidence of legislative motive,
give rise to an appearance of official sanction-i.e., that are inferentially
supportive of purposeful endorsement. Especially in instances where
legislative intent is not easily discernible, the effects test should focus
exclusively on such facts. Concurring in Pinette, Justice O'Connor
suggests this understanding of the constitutional inquiry:
The Clause is more than a negative prohibition against certain nar-
rowly defined forms of government favoritism; it also imposes af-
firmative obligations that may require a State, in some situations, to
take steps to avoid being perceived as supporting or endorsing a pri-
vate religious message. That is, the Establishment Clause forbids a
State from hiding behind the application of formally neutral criteria
and remaining studiously oblivious to the effects of its actions.58
This explication requires, at least "in some situations," that the court
disregard direct evidence of permissible intent and focus instead on the
apparent rather than intended meaning of government action.59 The
indeterminacy of this analysis will vary dramatically depending upon the
kind of evidence that the court weighs in support of the allegation.
a. Evidence of Comparative Advantage
Evidence reflecting a comparative advantage conferred on religion
by government-e.g., differentially favorable treatment of religion in the
allocation of public resources or assistance6 -is highly probative of an
intent to endorse and can be measured with significant objectivity. If
government refuses to accept a Christian symbol for display in a public
57. Smith, supra note 9, at 293-94 ("[O'Connor's description of the well-informed observer]
comes very close to saying that the observer knows... what the legislators intended.... [T]he judge
who examines the text, background, and implementation of a law and concludes that the law was not
intended to endorse religion should rule that an 'objective observer' examining the same factors
would draw the same conclusion. To rule otherwise would be to confess that the judge is not being
'objective."'); Feigenson, supra note 46, at 88 ("[Bjecause the objective observer looks to the 'in-
tended' meaning rather than the 'objective' meaning, Justice O'Connor collapses the effect test into
the purpose test.").
58. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
59. Id. ("Governmental intent cannot control .... Where the government's operation of a
public forum has the effect of endorsing religion, even if the governmental actor neither intends nor
actively encourages that result, the Establishment Clause is violated.") (citation omitted).
60. Cf Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Grumet, 512 U.S. at 714-15
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Pinette, 515 U.S. at 766.
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park while simultaneously permitting the display of Jewish imagery, the
Christian faith has been objectively disadvantaged. When religion or a
religious sect enjoys such a comparative advantage, an impermissible
message of favoritism or preference 61 quite likely is communicated
unless the arrangement is justified on the basis of some other neutral
effect (e.g., the accommodation of religious free exercise).62 By
affording comparatively advantageous treatment to religion in the
allocation of its benefits and resources, government communicates to the
political community that religion occupies a place of preference and that
nonadherents are correspondingly disfavored-the very effect that
Justice O'Connor's endorsement standard seeks to avert.63
With respect to the permanent religious displays considered in this
Article, this variant of apparent endorsement is highly relevant; nearly all
such displays found to violate the Establishment Clause enjoy some kind
of measurable advantage over other religious and secular speech.64  In
this context, the constitutional inquiry largely reduces to a determination
of differential advantage enjoyed by a particular religious display, vis a
vis competing expressive viewpoints, that cannot be justified on the basis
of some other neutral effect. Where religious speech enjoys superior
communicative status in any objectively measurable respect-be it
access to the forum, placement of the display, duration of occupancy, or
size of the expressive symbol-the well-informed observer will
reasonably conclude that the expression appears to enjoy the preference
65of government. At a minimum, such differential treatment places a
61. See, e.g., Pinette, 515 U.S. at 763 ("Our cases have accordingly equated 'endorsement'
with 'promotion' or 'favoritism."') (Scalia, J., writing for plurality); Grumet, 512 U.S. at 696; Alle-
gheny, 492 U.S. at 591; Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989); Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
62. An example of such a permissible benefit would be the exemption of religious adherents
from generally-applicable regulations requiring that they act in violation of religious beliefs. While
not constitutionally compelled by the Free Exercise Clause after Employment Division, Department
Of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), such a legislative accommodation would not
violate the Establishment Clause provided that it did not discriminate between similarly-situated
religious adherents. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 9, at 508-09; Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 632
(O'Connor, J., concurring); but see William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise
Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 320 (1991). Identifying the permissible boundaries of reli-
gious accommodation outside the context of compelled religious practice, however, requires subjec-
tive judgments that introduce an additional layer of indeterminacy into the analysis. Michael W.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 48 (1985).
63. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. This objectively measurable dimension of
apparent endorsement enjoys broad doctrinal and scholarly support. See, e.g., supra note 61;
McConnell, supra note 10, at 156-57 ("The target of the endorsement test should be favoritism or
preference .... [A] 'favoritism' or 'preference' test would enjoy the historical support that the pure
'endorsement' test so conspicuously lacks. The supporters of constitutional protections for religious
freedom were insistent that sect equality is an indispensable element of that freedom. To be sure,
their principal focus was on differences in material treatment, but it is no great stretch to extend the
principle to lesser evils."); Andrew Koppelman, No Expressly Religious Orthodoxy: A Response To
Steven D. Smith, 78 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 729, 735-36 (2003).
64. See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1010 (W.D. Wis. 2004)
("[A]lthough it is not always an easy task to reconcile all of the Court's decisions, one principle has
remained clear: the government may not demonstrate a preference for one religion over another."),
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heavy burden on government to offer some very persuasive reason why,
based on the surrounding facts, its conduct does not have an endorsing
effect.
b. Evidence of Intrinsic Advantage
By contrast, evidence reflecting an intrinsic advantage conferred on
religion-e.g., the inclusion of religious institutions in government
programs or activities that are perceived to confer some special sanction
or status upon participants6--is also consistent with an intent to endorse,
but the probative force of the evidence is irreducibly linked to the
subjective perceptions of the arbiter.67  To the extent that government
action does not distinguish between qualified religious and secular
beneficiaries, either because the benefit is conferred broadly or because it
is uniquely relevant to one or more religious recipients,68 it is impossible
to identify any objective advantage conferred on religion. Accordingly,
the determination whether such conduct too closely aligns government
with religion is inevitably a function of subjective judgment. 69 Even if
two competing onlookers share identical information, the conclusions
that they may draw regarding any appearance of endorsement arising in
this context will remain the product of subjective perception.70
Permanent religious displays erected on public property can also
communicate a message of intrinsic advantage and in this sense the
analysis of their constitutionality can be highly subjective. Apart from
any concrete advantage that religious speech enjoys in its access to a
communicative forum, the permanent display of religious symbols on
public parkland or adjacent to civic institutions strongly identifies the
speech with government itself.7' Assessing the degree to which such
linkage occurs, and the extent to which it communicates a message of
endorsement, is necessarily a function of the arbiter's personal values
and perspective.
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of the Eagles, Nos. 04-1321 and 04-
1524, 2005 WL 81886 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2005).
66. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 10, at 156 (criticizing application of endorsement stan-
dard in circumstances where "the government 'endorses' religion along with many other institutions
or ideologies").
67. See Gey I, supra note 8, at 478-79.
68. E.g., infra notes 338-45 and accompanying text.
69. Compare, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (majority upholds paro-
chial school's participation in textbook loan program on grounds that "[t]he law merely makes
available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books free of charge"), with
id. at 257 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the program impcrmissibly promotes religion be-
cause "[tihe textbook goes to the very heart of education in a parochial school").
70. Gey I, supra note 8, at 478-79 ("[E]very individual perceives the world differently, de-
pending on factors such as the individual's background, prejudices, sensitivity, and general personal-
ity.").
71. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 786 (Souter, J., concurring).
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The Supreme Court's decisions in Pinette and Allegheny reflect this
kind of discretionary assessment of communicative impact. In both
cases, the Justices reached widely divergent conclusions regarding the
endorsing effect of the temporary religious symbols at issue based on
widely divergent views of how closely the displays associated religion
with government.72  In Pinette, for example, the Justices sharply
disagreed over the perceived endorsing effect of a Ku Klux Klan cross
privately erected in the plaza adjacent to a state capital building.
73
Likewise in Allegheny, the Court sharply divided over the question
whether a Nativity scene in a courthouse appeared to endorse religion,
given that it stood alone at the base of the building's "Grand Staircase, 74
and whether the display of a menorah outside the building in conjunction
with a Christmas tree and a sign reading "Salute to Liberty" had a
different communicative effect.75  As these cases demonstrate, the
question whether the public display of any particular symbol
communicates that the government has conferred some form of intrinsic
advantage on religion does not lend itself to predictable assessment.
2. The Question of Measurable Injury
The second major criticism of the endorsement standard-that it ties
constitutional injury to the expressive impact of a challenged practice
rather than to coerced religious observance or support-raises more
fundamental concerns regarding the nature and purpose of the
constitutional guarantee. While a general discussion of the question is
beyond the scope of this Article, the critique has profound implications
for the specific types of Establishment Clause violations discussed
below. Under the critics' alternative analysis, the presence of a religious
monument, display, or statue on public land would neither violate nor
even implicate the Establishment Clause because its presence would not
76coerce religious observance. Accordingly, the permanent display of a
privately-erected and maintained religious monument (say, a 150-foot
tall crucifix on the steps of the Capitol Building) would be a
constitutional nonevent because any injury inflicted would merely be
72. Infra notes 73-75.
73. Pinene, 515 U.S. at 763-65 (Scalia, J., writing for plurality), 782-83 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring), 808-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and 817-18 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting),
74. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598-602 (Blackmun, J., writing for plurality), 663-67 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. Id. at 613-21 (Blackmun, J., writing for plurality), 632-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring),
637-46 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 652-655 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), 663-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("No
one was compelled to observe or participate in any religious ceremony or activity .... Passersby
who disagree with the message conveyed by these displays are free to ignore them, or even to turn
their backs, just as they are free to do when they disagree with any other form of government
speech."); Gey I, supra note 8, at 493 ("The placement of passive religious symbols on government
property almost always would be upheld under the coercion standard, in contrast to the separationist
approach, because it is virtually inconceivable that any religious symbol would 'coerce anyone to
support or participate in any religion or its exercise."').
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expressive-that is, nothing would be at stake but the "distressed
sensibilities 77 of religious minorities who might perceive the display as
alienating and degrading of their position in the polity. 78 Implicit in this
critique is the premise that such injury is not sufficiently damaging to the
aggrieved party-and thus, by aggregation, to the polity itself-to
outweigh the majoritarian "felt need" to express religious conviction.
79
This premise undervalues in at least two respects the impact of
permanent religious symbols displayed on public property. First, it fails
to acknowledge the concrete personal injury resulting from such offense:
burdening or precluding the use of public space by nonadherents.
Indeed, one of the two competing standing doctrines in this context
80
rests not on subjective "expressive" injury but on the concrete loss
suffered by persons for whom the use of public space is measurably
limited by the symbols of an alien faith. 81  As the Eleventh Circuit
recently recounted in Glassroth v. Moore, "[f]or Establishment Clause
claims based on non-economic harm, the plaintiffs must identify a
'personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged
constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence
presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one
disagrees.' 82  The court found such an injury in Glassroth because
plaintiffs had altered their conduct and incurred expenses "in order to
minimize contact" with a Ten Commandments monument erected in the
rotunda of Alabama's State Judicial Building, in part by avoiding entry
into the building itself.83
Second, the coercion critique fails to admit the broader structural
implications of these injuries. When a symbolic endorsement of religion
taints and constrains the use of public space, more is at stake than the
"distressed sensibilities" of impliedly hypersensitive religious minorities.
By selectively burdening access to public institutions and property, the
unconstitutional endorsement may distort the integrity and
77. See Choper, supra note 9, at 528.
78. See, e.g., id at 525-26; but see Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("I doubt not, for example, that the Clause forbids a city to permit the perma-
nent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall .... [S]uch an obtrusive year-round reli-
gious display would place the government's weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf
of a particular religion."). As Professor Gey observes, "[this seems true, but so what? Under the
coercion standard, if no one is coerced into practicing the particular faith represented by the cross,
where is the violation of the Establishment Clause? . . . The real reason that Justice Kennedy's
theory will not support his attempt to draw minute factual distinctions is that, at the most basic level,
Justice Kennedy is not wholly committed to his theory." Gey 1, supra note 8, at 496-97.
79. Choper, supra note 9, at 526-27.
80. See, e.g., Marc Rohr, Tilting at Crosses: Nontaxpayer Standing to Sue Under the Estab-
lishment Clause, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 495, 510-19 (1995) (discussing the two doctrines).
81. See, e.g., Separation of Church and State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 619 n.2
(9th Cir. 1996); ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1986); ACLU v. Rabun
County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098, 1103-08 (11 th Cir. 1983).
82. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1292 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
83. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1292-93.
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representativeness of deliberative government itself and thus undercut its
legitimacy. 84 For example, if religious monuments in the rotunda of a
city hall deter religious minorities from entering the building to offer
comment on matters of public concern-or, more generally, from
participating in a civic discourse that they perceive as hostile to their
faith 85-the deliberative process will be literally skewed. While this
distorting effect may seem trivial in the context of a single religious
display erected in a park, courthouse, or civic building, implementation
of the coercion standard may lead to a proliferation of such symbols in
the public domain and accordingly result in a meaningful diminution of
public participation by disaffected or intimidated religious minorities.
86
Because the coercion standard places virtually no constraints on
government's ability to erect sectarian displays on public property,87 it is
not difficult to envision government officials-particularly those in
regions where the political power of a dominant religious sect is most
potent and the corresponding threat to the political integration of
religious minorities is most severe-who exploit the opportunity to
broadly transform public facilities and property into platforms for
religious speech.88 In this context, the possibility of deterring political
participation by disaffected religious minorities is a genuine risk.89 In
turn, the threatened injury transcends the expressive interests of an
aggrieved minority and implicates the integrity of the political process
itself.90
In contrast to the assertion that the endorsement concept is too
protective of separationist interests, others argue that Justice O'Connor's
formulation is not sufficiently attentive to the injuries arising from
religious preference. Justice Stevens, while accepting apparent
endorsement as the appropriate constitutional standard, argues that
O'Connor's objective-observer test wrongly discounts the perceptions of
ordinary individuals and should be calibrated instead to "the universe of
84. Feigenson, supra note 46, at 69 & n.82.
85. Cf Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 607 (1992) ("When the government appropriates
religious truth, it 'transforms rational debate into theological decree.' Those who disagree no longer
are questioning the policy judgment of the elected but the rules of a higher authority who is beyond
reproach.") (internal citation omitted).
86. Feigenson, supra note 46, at 81.
87. Any retreat from this position requires the recognition that such symbols may have a
psychologically coercive effect on religious minorities, which in turn subjects the coercion standard
to the very criticism that its proponents direct toward O'Connor's endorsement test-that it rests on
a subjective rather than concrete injury. Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Compare McConnell, supra note 10, at 169 (in contrast to "a triumphalist majority relig-
ion," argues that the "more serious threat to religious pluralism today is a combination of indiffer-
ence to the plight of religious minorities and a preference for the secular in public affairs"), with Gey
I, supra note 8, at 489 ("[G]iven the fractious political battles along religious lines that recently have
taken place in large cities on both coasts, I doubt that the problem of overreaching by politically
active religious groups is as inconsequential or as infrequent as Professor McConnell believes.").
89. Gey I, supra note 8, at 495.
90. Feigenson, supra note 46, at 79.
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reasonable persons." 9' Several commentators have echoed this concern
and observed that, by tying the standard to an idealized observer with
essentially perfect knowledge, O'Connor betrays her ultimate objective:
assuring that religious affiliation has no impact on political standing.
92
Political standing is not experienced by omniscient observers but by real
people with perceptions and emotions that arise from unique personal
experience.9 3 In articulating the endorsement test, O'Connor thus faces
an insoluble dilemma: either to promote political inclusion by adopting a
standard that depends on the vagaries of myriad unique and competing
perspectives,94 or to promote a more objective test that conflicts with its
very rationale.
95
There is considerable force to this objection. As Professor Gey has
observed:
By employing an "objective observer" to decide questions of
endorsement, Justice O'Connor relays the message to religious
minorities that their perceptions are wrong; or, even worse, that their
perceptions do not matter. I can think of no more effective way to
"send[] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community.
It is not true, however, that the application of O'Connor's test inevitably
undercuts separationist values by providing an endless source of
legitimating rationales for apparent religious preference. This aspect of
the critique does not account for the circumstance-encountered with
some regularity-where the apparent preference arises not from the
challenged government action, viewed in relative isolation, but instead
from its broader factual context. In such situations, the test articulated by
Justice O'Connor is potentially more protective of separationist values
than the standard proposed by Justice Stevens. For example, in a recent
challenge to a cross on undeveloped federal property, the government
asserted that the cross was permissible because the land would likely
appear to an objective observer to be privately owned.97 Underscoring
the sophistication imputed to the observer under Justice O'Connor's
formulation, the district court rejected the argument and noted that the
91. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Feigenson, supra note 46, at 55; Gey I, supra note 8, at 481; Smith, supra note 9, at 294-
95.
93. Feigenson, supra note 46, at 55; Note, Developments in the Law: Religion and the State,
100 HARv. L. REV. 1606, 1648 (1987).
94. But see Feigenson, supra note 46, at 94-101 (arguing that the perceptions of ordinary
individuals could be integrated into the application of the endorsement standard by borrowing the
methodology of defamation law).
95. See, e.g., id. at 90-91.
96. Gey I, supra note 8, at 481.
97. Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2002), ajTd, 371 F.3d 543 (9th
Cir. 2004).
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relevant inquiry presumed knowledge of public ownership. 98 The test,
then, is not necessarily less protective of separationist values, as Justice
Stevens asserts, but is instead concerned with comparatively less
superficial appearances of endorsement-regardless of whether that
standard makes it more or less likely in any particular case that a
violation will be found.
As set forth in Part III, below, this conclusion has important
implications for the analysis of remedies under the Establishment Clause.
Careful consideration of the factual and historical context of an
unconstitutional display will likely require more stringent corrective
measures to dissipate the appearance of religious endorsement than an
alternative approach that considers remedial outcomes in greater
isolation from the circumstances giving rise to the violation itself. The
well-informed observer, knowledgeable that government has, in fact or
appearance, subjectively embraced and promoted a religious message,
will carefully assess any proposed remedy to assure that it eradicates the
taint of endorsement.99 To survive such scrutiny, a remedy must not
merely restore superficial neutrality but rather convince a skeptical
observer that government's preferential sentiment no longer colors its
conduct.'t°
II. APPLICATION OF THE ENDORSEMENT STANDARD TO PERMANENT
RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS ON PUBLIC LAND: THE THRESHOLD QUESTION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY
Justice O'Connor's reformulation of Lemon broadens the evident
scope of permissible religious expression on public land. A display that
formerly advanced religious interests in violation of Lemon may now be
permissible on grounds that it does not evince official endorsement of its
message.101 This refinement is evident in the Supreme Court's
assessment of temporary and seasonal religious displays, which reflects
considerable tolerance for various forms of religious expression in the
public domain. 0 2  Despite this relaxation of the constitutional
proscription, however, certain forms of symbolic religious speech remain
squarely at odds with the Establishment Clause. Specifically, courts
regularly conclude that religious symbols permanently displayed on
public property create in the well-informed observer a perception of
endorsement and thus violate the effects prong of O'Connor's
reformulated Lemon test, irrespective of government's articulated
98. Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
99. See infra notes 202-21 and accompanying text.
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 11- 19 and accompanying text.
102. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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purpose in erecting the display. 103 Cases supporting the proposition arelegion, and departures from it are rare. 04
A. The General Prohibition
As the United States Supreme Court observed over half a century
ago, symbolism is a direct and powerful method of expression:
The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea,
institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to mind. Causes
and nations, political parties, lodges and ecclesiastical groups seek to
knit the loyalty of their followings to a flag or banner, a color or
design. The State announces rank, function, and authority through
crowns and maces, uniforms and black robes; the church speaks
through the Cross, the Crucifix, the altar and shrine, and clerical
raiment. Symbols of State often convey political ideas just as
religious symbols come to convey theological ones. 105
When potent religious symbols such as crosses, menorahs, and crucifixes
are placed on public land, there is a real risk that the objective observer
will impute to government the symbolic message itself. As Justice
Souter has observed, "[w]hen an individual speaks in a public forum, it is
reasonable for an observer to attribute the speech, first and foremost, to
the speaker, while an unattended display (and any message it conveys)
can naturally be viewed as belonging to the owner of the land on which it
stands.' °6  The risk of attribution is heightened dramatically when the
religious display is not merely a temporary presence but instead a
permanent fixture. 1
07
While temporary religious displays can be diluted in their endorsing
effect by various secularizing influences and thus have been upheld in a
103. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text, and infra notes 121-24. In those instances
where government erects a display with the demonstrable purpose of endorsing its religious mes-
sage, the constitutional infirmity is clear. See, e.g., Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1296-97
(11 th Cir. 2003); Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 2001); Books
v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 302-04 (7th Cir. 2000); Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d
924, 929-30 (3d Cir. 1980); ACLU v. Ashbrook, 211 F. Supp. 2d 873, 883-89 (N.D. Ohio 2002),
afftd, 375 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2004); ACLU v. Hamilton County, 202 F. Supp. 2d 757, 763-64 (E.D.
Tenn. 2002); Adland v. Russ, 107 F. Supp. 2d 782, 784-85 (E.D. Ky. 2000), aftd, 307 F.3d 471 (6th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 999 (2003). The focus of the discussion below is on the more
general case where permanent religious displays are erected on public land in the absence of such
dispositive evidence of impermissible intent and are thus assessed by considering whether they give
rise to a perception of endorsement.
104. See infra notes 121-24.
105. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943); see, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-
Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
106. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 786 (Souter, J., concurring).
107. See, e.g., Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[Wlhile
previous ... uses of the Park suggesting religious activity could be clearly tied to a speaker, the
display of this unattended, solitary, semi-permanent symbol could not; and in the absence of a live
speaker to whom responsibility could be attributed, the City was perceived as fulfilling the role of
sponsor."); Alberto B. Lopez, Equal Access and the Public Forum: Pinette's Imbalance of Free
Speech and Establishment, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 167, 214-15 (2003).
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variety of contexts, 08 the permanent presence of a religious symbol on
public property tips the constitutional calculation decidedly toward the
appearance of endorsement.1°9 Even Justice Kennedy, who emphatically
opposes the endorsement standard as inappropriately hostile to the
accommodation of religion, suggests that the permanent display of
religious symbols fundamentally alters the constitutional equation. 110 In
his dissenting opinion in Allegheny, Kennedy (joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia) repeatedly distinguished the
temporary religious display at issue from more suspect cases involving
"permanent," "year-round," and "continual" religious symbols on public
property,"' and pointed to the permanent display of a cross atop a
municipal building as an archetypical case of unconstitutionality: "I
doubt not . ..that the Clause forbids a city to permit the permanent
erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall .... [S]uch an
obtrusive year-round religious display would place the government's
weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular
religion."'12 In rejecting Justice Kennedy's intimation that the temporary
nature of a display might immunize a religious symbol from
constitutional challenge, the Allegheny majority underscored the
indisputably suspect nature of permanent religious displays-indicating
that every Justice of the Court agreed upon the predicate proposition." 
3
A host of cases affirm the principle 
14
108. E.g., Pinette, 515 U.S. at 763; Chabad-Lubavitch v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (1lth
Cir. 1993) (en banc); Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 1993); Arm. United for
Separation of Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1541, 1546 (6th Cir. 1992);
Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 619 (7th Cir. 1992) (en bane).
109. See infra note 114.
110. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 667-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111. Id. at 661, 664-65 & n.3; see id at 608 n.56 ("In describing what would violate his 'prose-
lytization' test, Justice Kennedy uses the adjectives 'permanent,' 'year-round,' and 'continual,' as if
to suggest that temporary acts of favoritism for a particular sect do not violate the Establishment
Clause.") (citations omitted).
112. Id. at 661.
113. Id at 608 n.56 ("In any event, the Court [has] repudiated any notion that preferences for
particular religious beliefs are permissible unless permanent ....").
114. See, e.g., Ind. Civil Liberties Union, 259 F.3d at 773; Books, 235 F.3d at 306; Gonzales v.
N. Township of Lake County, 4 F.3d 1412, 1423 (7th Cir. 1993); Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d
1518, 1529 (9th Cir. 1993) (Beezer, J., concurring); Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1412 (7th
Cir. 1991); Kaplan, 891 F.2d at 1030; Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th
Cir. 1985); Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1011 (W.D. Wis. 2004), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of the Eagles, Nos. 04-1321 and 04-1524, 2005
WL 81886 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2005); Kimbley v. Lawrence County, 119 F. Supp. 2d 856, 873 (S.D.
Ind. 2000); Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 110 F. Supp. 2d 842, 858 (S.D. Ind. 2000),
aff'd, 259 F.3d 766; Doe v. County of Montgomery, 915 F. Supp. 32, 38 n.16 (C.D. Ill 1996); Clever
v. Cherry Hill Township Bd. of Educ., 838 F. Supp. 929, 937 (D.N.J. 1993); Murphy v. Bilbray, 782
F. Supp. 1420, 1438 (S.D. Cal. 1991), aff'd sub nom. Ellis, 990 F.2d 1518; Joki v. Bd. of Educ. of
Schuylerville Cent. Sch. Dist., 745 F. Supp. 823, 831 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); Spacco v. Bridgewater Sch.
Dep't, 722 F. Supp. 834, 843 (D. Mass. 1989); ACLU v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222, 235 (S.D. Tex.
1984); cf. ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 273 (7th Cir. 1986); McCreary v. Stone, 739
F.2d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1984); Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 788 F. Supp. 445, 451 (S.D. Cal. 1991),
afftd, I F.3d 775; Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298, 313 (Or. 1986).
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The endorsing message communicated by permanent religious
displays typically results from both the comparative advantage conferred
on religious speech by its superior access to an expressive venue as well
as the intrinsic advantage conferred by the proximity of religious
symbols to, and their integration with, the physical presence of
government itself. Cases involving permanent religious displays usually
arise in the physical context of public parks, plazas, or civic buildings.' 
5
These spaces figuratively or literally manifest government authority.
16
Affording religious speech permanent access to such quintessentially
public space communicates to nonadherents that they are political
outsiders, in derogation of the core value protected by the endorsement
test, by literally merging the physical presence of the state with the
message of another faith. 1'7
Scores of suits have challenged permanent religious symbols on
grounds that the displays violate the federal Establishment Clause or
analogous state constitutional provisions. While no per se rule of
unconstitutionality has been recognized' 18-and, indeed, such a rule
would conflict with the fact-specific inquiry mandated by the
endorsement standard"9-the challenged displays have been struck
down in the overwhelming majority of recent cases. 20  Courts have
specifically rejected the constitutionality of crosses and crucifixes.'
115. See, e.g., infra notes 121-24.
116. Cf Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966); Chambers v. City of Frederick, 292 F.
Supp. 2d 766, 772 (D. Md. 2003).
117. Cf. Idleman, supra note 18, at 25 ("Because it is perception-based, moreover, 'the en-
dorsement test is particularly concerned with whether governmental practices create a "symbolic
union" of church and state."') (quoting Brooks v. City of Oak Ridge, 222 F.3d 259, 264 (6th Cir.
2000)).
118. Cf Lopez, supra note 107, at 224 (proposing per se rule barring the permanent display of
religious symbols on public land on grounds that religious organizations may monopolize available
public space; "[t]o combat the exclusion fostered by the dominance of the public forum allowed
under existing government policy, the only remedy that is truly neutral is to ban all permanent reli-
gious messages from public grounds"). As set forth infra notes 121-41 and accompanying text, this
proposed rule would largely confirm the outcomes reached under existing doctrine, with the excep-
tion of cases involving symbols with mixed secular and religious significance.
119. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 778 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597.
120. See infra notes 121-31. Some older cases upheld the permanent display of such symbols.
See, e.g., Meyer v. Oklahoma City, 496 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1972); Paul v. Dade County, 202 So.2d 833
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 558 P.2d 338 (Or. 1976).
121. Decisions striking down the permanent display of crosses and crucifixes on public land
include: Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004); Carpenter v. City and County of San Fran-
cisco, 93 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 1996) (decided under the California Constitution); Separation of Church
and State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 1996); Gonzales, 4 F.3d 1412; Ellis, 990
F.2d 1518 (decided under California Constitution); ACLU v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce,
Inc., 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983); Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (C.D. Cal. 2002);
Murphy, 782 F. Supp. 1420 (decided under the California Constitution); Jewish War Veterans v.
United States, 695 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1988); Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222; cf. City of St. Charles, 794
F.2d 265. Courts also have struck down the display of crosses on government shields, seals, and
insignia. Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1528; Harris, 927 F.2d at 1412-15; Friedman, 781 F.2d at 781-82; Mur-
phy, 782 F. Supp. at 1436; contra, Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991) (uphold-
ing cross on city insignia).
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biblical statuary,122  monuments engraved with the Ten
Commandments, 123 and other sectarian symbols and images 124 which are
permanently displayed on public property. Courts have reached this
conclusion irrespective of whether the religious symbols were erected by
125 2government or private parties, 2 financed with private or public funds, 26
adjacent to or distant from government buildings, 27 displayed alone or in
122. Decisions striking down the permanent display of religious statuary on public land in-
clude: Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2000),
and Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561 (9th Cir. 1991) (decided under the California Constitution).
123. Decisions striking down public monuments or plaques engraved with the Ten Command-
ments, as well as the posting of the Ten Commandments in public buildings, include: Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); ACLU v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2004); ACLU v. City of
Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 6636 (8th Cir. Apr. 6, 2004); Baker v. Adams County/Ohio Valley Sch. Bd., Nos. 02-3776
and 02-3777, 2004 WL 68523 (6th Cir. Jan. 12, 2004); ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438
(6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 310 (2004); Glassroth, 335 F.3d 1282; Adland v. Russ, 307
F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2002); Ind. Civil Liberties Union, 259 F.3d 766; Books, 235 F.3d 292; Mercier,
305 F. Supp. 2d 999; Turner v. Habersham County, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Mercier
v. City of La Crosse, 276 F. Supp. 2d 961 (W.D. Wis. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 2005 WL
81886; Ashbrook, 211 F. Supp. 2d 873; ACLU v. Rutherford County, 209 F. Supp. 2d 799 (M.D.
Tenn. 2002); Hamilton County, 202 F. Supp. 2d 757; ACLU v. Grayson County, No. Civ.A.4:O1CV-
202-M, 2002 WL 1558688 (W.D. Ky. May 13, 2002); ACLU v. City of Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp.
2d 1024 (D. Neb. 2002); ACLU v. McCreary County, 145 F. Supp. 2d 845 (E.D. Ky. 2001);
Kimbley, 119 F. Supp. 2d 856; Adland, 107 F. Supp. 2d 782; ACLU v. Pulaski County, 96 F. Supp.
2d 691 (E.D. Ky. 2000); ACLU v. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679 (E.D. Ky. 2000); Doe v.
Harlan County Sch. Dist., 96 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2000); Harvey v. Cobb County, 811 F.
Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993), aff'd, 15 F.3d 1097 (11th Cit. 1994); Ring v. Grand Forks Pub. Sch.
Dist. Number 1, 483 F. Supp. 272 (D.N.D. 1980); DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist., 87 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Young v. County of Charleston, No. 97 -CP-10-3491, 1999 WL
33530383 (S.C. Com. PI. Jan. 21, 1999).
A few courts have upheld monuments engraved with the Ten Commandments on grounds
that the inclusion of secular symbols diminishes the religious effect of the text (particularly where
the text does not dominate the display), where the text itself is deemed predominantly secular rather
than religious, or where the display has existed for an extended period of time and thus purportedly
gained independent historical significance. Modrovich v. Allegheny County, 385 F.3d 397 (3d Cir.
2004); Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cit. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 346 (2004);
Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003); ACLU v. Mercer County, 219 F.
Supp. 2d 777 (E.D. Ky. 2002); Christian v. City of Grand Junction, No. 01-CV-685, 2001 WL
34047958 (D. Colo. June 27, 2001); Suhre v. Haywood County, 55 F. Supp. 2d 384 (W.D.N.C.
1999); Colorado v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 898 P.2d 1013 (Colo. 1995). A thirty-
year-old decision of the Tenth Circuit upholding a Ten Commandments monument based on similar
reasoning appears to have been repudiated. Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29 (10th
Cir. 1973); see Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1000 n.3 (10th Cit. 2002), and Summum
v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 910 n.2 and 912 n.8 (10th Cit. 1997). The split in authority over the
permissibility of such displays will likely be resolved by the Supreme Court this term, following its
grant of certiorari to review the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Van Orden and the Sixth Circuit's opinion
in McCreary County.
124. See, e.g., Kaplan, 891 F.2d 1024 (menorah); Doe, 915 F. Supp. 32 (sign stating "The
World Needs God"); Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222 (Star of David).
125. Compare, e.g., Hamilton County, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 763-64, Kimbley, 119 F. Supp. 2d at
859-60, and Eckels, 589 F. Supp. at 224, with Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1414, Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1525, and
Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1205, 1216-17.
126. Compare, e.g., Hamilton County, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 759-61, with Rabun, 698 F.2d at
1110 & n.22.
127. Compare, e.g., Glassroth, 335 F.3d 1282, and Books, 235 F.3d at 306, with Separation of
Church & State Comm., 93 F.3d at 625-26 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring), Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at
1008-09, and Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
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combination with other religious or secular items, 28 or characterized as
serving either a religious or secular purpose.' 29  The permanency of the
symbols plays a central role in this reasoning. 130  As the court in Doe v.
County of Montgomery noted:
Unlike the vast majority of Establishment Clause cases (where a
particular religious symbol is intended to be displayed for a short
period of time, usually around the Christmas season), the sign here is
displayed on the Courthouse 24 hours a day and 365 days a year.
Both the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have recognized that
such a situation presents a more compelling scenario for finding a
constitutional violation.' 31
The handful of cases departing from this paradigm involve less
potent religious symbols which are occasionally characterized as secular
in effect and thus outside the Establishment Clause prohibition. 32 This
conclusion is especially likely when the challenged symbol is part of a
larger display that includes secular objects in addition to religious
imagery.' 33 The most common case involves monuments engraved with
the Ten Commandments. The minority of courts upholding such
displays typically accord determinative significance to their
characterization of the text as contextually secular, 134 in contrast to the
undeniably sectarian import of other religious symbols,' 35 and cast the
monument as but one component of a larger collection of displays
memorializing some broad, secular theme.136  In dissenting from the
denial of certiorari in a recent case, Chief Justice Rehnquist articulated
the proposition: "To be sure, the Ten Commandments are a 'sacred text
in the Jewish and Christian faiths,' concerning, in part, 'the religious
duties of believers.' Undeniably, however, the Commandments have
128. Compare, e.g., McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, Ind. Civil Liberties Union, 259 F.3d at
778 (Coffey, J., dissenting), Books, 235 F.3d at 317 (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), Grayson County, 2002 WL 1558688, and Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222, with Carpenter, 93 F.3d
627, Gonzales, 4 F.3d 1412, Ellis, 990 F.2d 1518, and Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202.
129. Compare, e.g., Hamilton County, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 763-64, and Eckels, 589 F. Supp. at
233-34, with Jewish War Veterans, 695 F. Supp. at 12-14.
130. Supra note 114; see, e.g., Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1423; Ind. Civil Liberties Union, 259 F.3d at
773; Kimbley, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 873.
131. Doe, 915 F. Supp. at 38 n.16,
132. See, e.g., supra note 123.
133. See, e.g., Van Orden, 351 F.3d 173; Mercer County, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 794; Suhre, 55 F.
Supp. 2d at 395-96. In a related context, the Supreme Court has expressed approval of its own
depiction of Moses and the Ten Commandments, in conjunction with the display of various other
historical figures, on the wall of its courtroom: "Indeed, a carving of Moses holding the Ten Com-
mandments, surrounded by representations of other historical legal figures, adorns the frieze on the
south wall of our courtroom, and we have said that the carving 'signals respect not for great prosely-
tizers but for great lawgivers."' City of Elkhart v. Books, 532 U.S. 1058, 121 S. Ct. 2209, 2212
(2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (internal citation omitted).
134. Supra note 123.
135. See, e.g., infra note 140.
136. Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1007 ("[A]lmost without exception, the only public displays
of the Ten Commandments that courts have upheld are those that are included in a larger display
with an overall secular message.").
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secular significance as well, because they have made a substantial
contribution to our secular legal codes." 137 Rehnquist concludes that the
disputed monument, in the context of its physical display alongside two
secular monuments on the lawn of a municipal building, "simply reflects
the Ten Commandments' role in the development of our legal system,
just as the war memorial and Freedom Monument reflect the history and
culture of the city of Elkhart."'
13 8
Whether one accepts the force of this or any similar distinction,
139
the argument is necessarily inapplicable to government's display of an
intrinsically sectarian religious symbol such as a cross, crucifix, or Star
of David. 140  However broadly or narrowly the courts may construe the
religious character of a creche or a monument to the Ten
Commandments, the irreducibly religious import of certain symbols-
and the resulting infirmity of their permanent display on public land-is
not in meaningful dispute.
14'
B. Exceptions to the General Rule
Courts are regularly urged to depart from this analysis on grounds
that various secularizing influences dissipate the endorsing effect of
permanent sectarian symbols. Most common is the effort to secularize
the use of a religious symbol by characterizing its function as a memorial
137. City of Elkhart, 532 U.S. 1058, 121 S. Ct. at 2211 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari) (internal citations omitted).
138. Id. at 2212. The myriad cases dealing with temporary Christmas displays, in which courts
often uphold the inclusion of a creche amid secular items such as the now-infamous plastic reindeer
of Lynch v. Donnelly, involve analogous reasoning. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671, 679-83.
Substantial weight is often accorded the fact that a creche is an historical representation of the birth
of Jesus rather than an exclusively religious symbol, which assertedly fortifies the secular effect of
the overall display. Id.; see, e.g., ACLU v. County of Delaware, 726 F. Supp. 184, 190 (S.D. Ohio
1989); Stein v. Plainwell Cmty. Sch., 610 F. Supp. 43, 47 (W.D. Mich. 1985), rev'd, 822 F.2d 1406
(6th Cir. 1987).
139. The Supreme Court is expected to address and resolve the question this term. McCreary
County, 354 F.3d 438, cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 310; Van Orden, 351 F.3d 173, cert. granted, 125 S.
Ct. 346.
140. Libin v. Town of Greenwich, 625 F. Supp. 393, 400 (D. Conn. 1985) ("The cross, in the
context of Christmas, is a purely religious symbol. Unlike a creche, it has no historical connection to
the holiday. The only purpose served by the display of the cross, even in the context of the Christ-
mas holiday, is to express religious sentiment."); see generally Barnette. 319 U.S. at 632; Carpenter,
93 F.3d at 630; Separation of Church & State Comm., 93 F.3d at 620; Harris, 927 F.2d at 1403; St.
Charles, 794 F.2d at 271; Rabun, 698 F.2d at 1103; Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1429 & n.26; Mendel-
son v. City of St. Cloud, 719 F. Supp. 1065, 1069 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Hewitt v. Joyner, 705 F. Supp.
1443, 1449 (C.D. Cal.1989), rev'd on other grounds, 940 F.2d 1561; Jewish War Veterans, 695 F.
Supp. at 13; Eckels, 589 F. Supp. at 234; Okrand v. City of Los Angeles, 254 Cal. Rptr. 913, 922
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
141. See, e.g., supra notes 121-22.
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to war veterans, 142  although government defendants have also
characterized the function of such displays on other secular grounds-
asserting, for example, that a disputed cross serves merely as a tourist
attraction 143 or a navigational reference for overhead aircraft. 144 Courts
almost always find that these rationales are a pretextual excuse for
otherwise unconstitutional activity and conclude, irrespective of pretext,
that the endorsing effect of a sectarian symbol is not dissipated by any
additional secular function it may serve. 145  As one court observed,
"[e]ven if one strains to view the [religious] symbols in the context of a
war memorial, their primary effect is to give the impression that only
Christians and Jews are being honored . ,,146
There are only a handful of circumstances in which courts have
recognized possible exceptions to the general rule barring the permanent
display of sectarian symbols on public land. In particular, where
religious symbols have independent historical significance, or where
private religious displays are erected in a public forum for permanent
symbolic speech, courts have reasoned that the objective observer will
perceive no endorsement of the religious message.
1. The Historical Rationale
Cases involving an historical rationale for the permanent display of
religious symbols address two distinct arguments. The first involves
sectarian symbols that are linked to independent historical events, while
the second involves symbols whose historical significance derives from
the duration of the display itself. The persuasive force of the respective
assertions differs considerably.
When a religious symbol is linked to an event of independent
historical significance, courts typically find that the communicative
impact of the display is predominantly secular and thus permissible. 147
As the Ninth Circuit noted in Ellis v. City of La Mesa, "[e]ven a purely
142. See, e.g., Separation of Church & State Comm., 93 F.3d at 619; Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1421;
Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1527; Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1215 & n.8; Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1437-38;
Jewish War Veterans, 695 F. Supp. at 13-14; Eckels, 589 F. Supp. at 233-35.
143. Rabun, 698 F.2d at 1110-11.
144. Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1433.
145. E.g., supra notes 121-24.
146. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. at 235.
147. See, e.g., Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1422 n.9 ("We distinguish between the historical signifi-
cance that a symbol may achieve because of an unusual or unique event or circumstances surround-
ing it, from the local cultural landmark significance that a symbol may achieve simply because it is
displayed."); cf Okrand, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 922 (upholding display of Katowitz Menorah, saved from
the Holocaust, on grounds that its "unique historical background [renders it] much more a museum
piece than a symbol of religious worship").
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religious symbol may acquire independent historical significance by
virtue of its being associated with significant non-religious events."
148
Thus the public display of an historic crucifix on the wall of publicly-
owned California mission 149 is not likely to be deemed an endorsement
of religion in view of the secular significance of Catholic missionaries in
the cultural, ethnic, and political history of the state. 150 This outcome is
consistent with the principles underlying the endorsement standard, since
there is no genuine comparative advantage afforded religion by such an
historical display (unless government excludes secular items of similar
historical significance), nor is there any intrinsic advantage conferred on
religion (provided that the religious symbols are displayed as historical
artifacts rather than objects of veneration).
151
The proposition that permanent religious displays should be upheld
on the basis of mere longevity, however, has been widely repudiated, as
illustrated by the reaction to the district court's decision in Carpenter v.
City and County of San Francisco.152 In upholding defendant's display
of the Mt. Davidson Cross, the lower court in Carpenter reasoned that
the symbol was not predominantly religious in its effect because
President Roosevelt had dedicated the exhibit and because the cross had
gained recognition over the intervening years as a "cultural" landmark.
153
The Seventh Circuit replied:
The [Carpenter] court's decision that local and cultural landmark
status gave secular effect to the cross in that case smacks of
bootstrapping . . . . [T]he landmark status seems to have been
achieved, in large part, by virtue of the duration of the display-the
longer the violation, the less violative it becomes .... We do not
accept this sort of bootstrapping argument as a defense to an
148. Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1526.
149. Dana Wilkie, Mission Funding Hits Constitutional Roadblock, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIBUNE, March 10, 2004, at Al (two of California's 21 missions are owned by the state; the re-
mainder are owned by the Catholic Church).
150. See generally, James Sandos, Between Crucifix and Lance: Indian-White Relations in
California, 1769-1848, in CONTESTED EDEN: CALIFORNIA BEFORE THE GOLD RUSH 196-229
(Ram6n A. Gutirrez & Richard J. Orsi, eds., 1998); ROBERT H. JACKSON & EDWARD CASTILLO,
INDIANS, FRANCISCANS AND SPANISH COLONIZATION: THE IMPACT OF THE MISSION SYSTEM ON
THE CALIFORNIA INDIANS 11-107 (1995).
151. Similarly, the display of religious symbols with independent artistic significance-e.g., a
painting of the Crucifixion in the National Gallery-is permissible as well, provided that the same
conditions are satisfied. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 652-53 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
152. Carpenter v. City and County of San Francisco, 803 F. Supp. 337, 349-50 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (decided under the California Constitution), rev'd, 93 F.3d 627.
153. Carpenter, 803 F. Supp. at 349-50.
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Establishment Clause violation, nor have we found any other case
that adopted this reasoning.' 
54
The Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed the district court, ruling that the
cross lacked any "history independent of its religious significance" and
noting that "there is nothing about FDR's transcontinental contact that
converts the Cross into an historical relic."'
155
This analysis is consistent with Justice O'Connor's discussion of the
role of history in assessing the endorsing effect of a religious practice or
display. In Allegheny, O'Connor responded at length to Justice
Kennedy's charge that application of the endorsement test "without
artificial exceptions for historical practice" 56  would require the
invalidation of "many traditional practices recognizing the role of
religion in our society."' 157 In defending the constitutionality of various
forms of "ceremonial deism,"158 Justice O'Connor stressed that such
practices will not "survive Establishment Clause scrutiny simply by
virtue of their historical longevity alone" but rather are permissible
because they do not violate "the values protected" by the constitutional
provision. 159  She specifically linked the permissibility of ceremonial
deism to its "nonsectarian nature"-a consideration almost never present
in disputes regarding the display of religious symbols on public land-
and summarized the relevant inquiry as focusing on whether
"longstanding practices . . . serve a secular purpose rather than a
sectarian one and have largely lost their religious significance over
time." 16 Accordingly, as framed by O'Connor, the historical context of a
challenged display is relevant not because of the mere passage of time
but instead because independent historical developments may effectively
divest the display of its religious significance.
161
154. Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1422.
155. Carpenter, 93 F.3d at 631; see also Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1526 ("[A] display's historical
significance must be independent of the display's religious content."); Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at
1431.
156. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157. Id. at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 631; see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2325-26 (2004)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
161. In a recent departure from this prevailing analysis, the Third Circuit revived the longevity
rationale to justify the display of a Ten Commandments plaque in a Pennsylvania county courthouse.
The court in Freethought Society v. Chester County held that "the age and history of the plaque
provide a context which changes the effect of an otherwise religious plaque." 334 F.3d at 264; see
also Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 406-12 (adhering to Freethought analysis). In attempting to character-
ize the religious display as a secular undertaking, the court offered the tautological proposition that
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The weight of authority rejecting the longevity rationale properly
reflects the values underpinning the prohibition against apparent
endorsement. The endorsing effect of a permanent sectarian symbol that
enjoys preferential access to an expressive venue-for example, the
towering crosses at the apex of hilltop parks at issue in the Carpenter and
Murphy cases-is not likely diminished by the passage of time. To the
contrary, the duration underscores the depth of connection between the
religious display and government itself.162 When an irreducibly sectarian
symbol on public land becomes so embedded in the self-identity of a
political community that it attains the status of a cherished landmark, the
fundamental concern of the endorsement standard-"send[ing] a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders" 163-is squarely
implicated.
2. The Public Forum Exception
The only other potential qualification to the general prohibition
against permanent religious displays is the improbable case where
government creates a public forum for permanent symbolic speech, thus
permitting the perpetual display of many different private symbols
without regard to content or viewpointT64 Because government could
not favor the message of any proposed display in regulating access to the
forum, all symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment would
require equal accommodation without regard to how gravely it might
offend the viewing public.165  As the Supreme Court noted in Pinette,
"giving sectarian religious speech preferential access to a forum close to
the seat of government (or anywhere else for that matter) would violate
"[tlhe reasonable observer, knowing the age of the Ten Commandments plaque, would regard the
decision to leave it in place as motivated, in significant part, by the desire to preserve a longstanding
plaque." Freethought Soc'y, 334 F.3d at 265. The analysis transforms the endorsement inquiry into
a standardless race against the clock: if a concededly religious display survives long enough without
challenge, the endorsing effect may disappear at some moment of the court's own choosing and the
commemorated text then transmutes into a secularized object communicating merely the fact that it
is old. As the court noted in Gonzales, this reasoning unhinges the inquiry from any meaningful
connection to the actual communicative impact of a religious display. Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1422.
162. Carpenter, 93 F.3d at 631 ("Rather than having a history independent of its religious
significance, the Mount Davidson Cross' history is intertwined with its religious symbolism ....
'This kind of historical significance simply exacerbates the appearance of govemmental preference
for a particular religion."').
163. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
164. See, e.g., Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1020.
165. Id. ("Perhaps like other communities experiencing similar controversies, the City is wary
of the types of displays it would have to accept if it used content-neutral criteria in evaluating
them."). The court in Mercier describes a controversy in Boise, Idaho, in which the city council
voted to remove a Ten Commandments monument from a public park after receiving a request from
an anti-gay activist to erect an accompanying monument "claiming that Matthew Shepard is in hell
because he was gay." Id.
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the Establishment Clause (as well as the Free Speech Clause, since it
would involve content discrimination).' 66  The constitutional principles
governing the administration of any public forum of this nature would
thus give rise to the peculiar scenario of crosses, swastikas, pentagrams,
menorahs, and myriad other private symbols, all displayed side by side
on public land.
167
While such a forum would diminish the appearance of endorsement
for any particular viewpoint, religious or otherwise, it would create
significant problems regarding regulation of access, apportionment of
space, and the accommodation of other public uses. Because each parcel
would represent a unique and differentially valuable venue for symbolic
expression, and because the public space available for this use
necessarily would be finite, how would government apportion the
property among multiple applicants? 168  As a matter of public policy,
why would government conclude that such a m6lange of private symbols
would be the best use of public space? 169 Finally, it is questionable
whether such an arrangement would sufficiently dissipate the appearance
of endorsement, since those speakers fortunate enough to obtain space
would express their views in perpetuity and to the permanent exclusion
of every other competing message. 170  Such considerations suggest that
this possible exception to the general prohibition against permanent
religious displays on public property is more likely a theoretical concern
than a practical option.'
7'
166. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 766; see also Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Beverly Hills, 90 F.3d 379,
383 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
167. Cf. Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 587 P.2d 663, 665 (Cal. 1978) (Noting diversity of reli-
gious imagery, including "Coptic, Universalist, [and] Scientology crosses, the Buddhist wheel,
Shinto torii, Confucian yang-yin, Jain swastika, Zoroastrian vase of fire, [and] Unitarian flaming
chalice," court observes that "[tlhe [Los Angeles] city hall is not an immense bulletin board whereon
symbols of all faiths could be thumbtacked or otherwise displayed. Would it be justifiable, say, to
allow only a Star of Bethlehem, a Star of David, and a Star and Crescent?").
168. Cf Pinente, 515 U.S. at 777-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (identifying "the fortuity of
geography" and "the nature of the particular public space" as factors which might lead to the appar-
ent endorsement of private religious speech in a public forum).
169. Cf supra notes 165, 167.
170. See supra note 168. In her concurring opinion in Pinette, Justice O'Connor signaled that
private religious speech likely will not offend Establishment Clause principles if "allowed on equal
terms in a vigorous public forum that the government has administered properly." Pinette, 515 U.S.
at 775 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She stressed, however, that "a private religious group may so
dominate a public forum that a formal policy of equal access is transformed into a demonstration of
approval," Id. at 777-78 (citation omitted); see Lopez, supra note 107, at 223 ("A facially neutral
policy that allows domination of a public forum . . . by the permanent religious messages of one
religious tradition in the absence of others prefers some religious sects over others and, at the very
least, favors religion over nonreligion.").
171. In a related context, the Tenth Circuit recently assessed the First Amendment implications
of a Ten Commandments monument displayed-evidently without challenge--on the grounds of a
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As the preceding discussion reflects, a very substantial body of
federal decisional law condemns the permanent display of sectarian
symbols on public property. If the expressive effect of a symbol is
clearly religious, courts virtually never uphold its permanent display
unless it possesses independent historical significance or is privately
displayed in a public forum. This jurisprudence reflects the evident fact
that the permanent integration of sectarian symbols with the physical
presence of government itself communicates a powerful message of
preference for the favored creed, in violation of the central value of
political inclusion that animates Justice O'Connor's endorsement
standard.
III. APPLICATION OF THE ENDORSEMENT STANDARD TO
IMPERMISSIBLE RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS: THE REMEDIAL INQUIRY
Having refined the Lemon inquiry by shifting the analytic focus to
the question of actual or apparent endorsement of religion, and having
entrusted the latter inquiry to an exceptionally well-informed observer,
Justice O'Connor's endorsement standard requires a corresponding
refinement of the analysis of remedies. The existing jurisprudence
addressing permanent religious displays, however, reflects little attention
to the quite rigorous remedial implications of the endorsement test. In
contrast to the careful and consistent assessment of the prohibition itself,
the analysis of remedies is an ad hoc and often superficial exercise with
little doctrinal grounding-in keeping with the unfortunate treatment of
municipal building in Ogden, Utah. Summum, 297 F.3d at 99-1000 & n.3 ("Summum's concession
[that the display did not violate the Establishment Clause] may have been unwise; the Establishment
Clause issue is certainly not so straightforward as the City would presume."). Plaintiffs, rather than
seeking removal of the monument, argued that its presence required the city to accept for display
monuments commemorating other religious beliefs, and challenged the city's refusal to permit the
placement of a monument to the tenets of "Summum" on that basis. Id. at 1000. The circuit court
concluded that Ogden's display of various monuments established a nonpublic forum, since the
"gallery of permanent monuments on the Municipal Grounds constitutes 'public property which is
not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication,"' and thus that the city's admini-
stration of the property was subject only to the requirements of reasonableness and viewpoint-
neutrality. Id. at 1002-03. However, the court found that the city's refusal to "treat with equal
dignity speech from divergent religious perspectives," id. at 1011, constituted precisely such imper-
missible viewpoint discrimination, id. at 1009, and accordingly barred Ogden from "display[ing] the
Ten Commandments Monument while declining to display" competing religious monuments. Id. at
1011. Thus, even in circumstances where a permanent religious display survives or averts challenge
under the Establishment Clause, the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in a nonpublic forum may
compel the inclusion of competing religious speech.
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remedies generally as "the poor cousin" '72 of corresponding substantive
rights. Against this backdrop, Part III begins by posing a general
framework for the remedial analysis, then turns to its application across a
range of measures that have been proposed in recent litigation
concerning permanent religious displays. The discussion focuses
exclusively on injunctive remedies, since damages for such violations are
nominally valued in the typical case 173 and are thus an insignificant
aspect of the remedial scheme.
1 74
As a preliminary matter, it is important to situate the discussion
within the broader context of remedies law. Injunctive relief may take
many forms and promote a range of objectives, and the identification of a
proper remedy presupposes a particular remedial goal. While the general
objective of all remedies is to "return a plaintiff to her rightful position-
the position she would have been in but for the constitutional
wrong"175-the particular means necessary to achieve that result will
vary considerably depending upon the nature of the unconstitutional
conduct at issue. Violations rooted in complex institutional practices,
such as the entrenched racial inequalities at issue in the Supreme Court's
desegregation jurisprudence 76 or the prison conditions addressed in
contemporary Eighth Amendment law, 177 present difficult remedial
challenges that the federal courts have met over time with widely
divergent approaches. In some instances, the courts have employed
172. Tracy A. Thomas, Congress' Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 673, 679-80 (2001) (hereinafter Thomas 1) (remedies "given short shrift in legal jurispru-
dence").
173. Chambers v. City of Frederick, 292 F. Supp. 2d 766, 772-73 (D. Md. 2003). Where
plaintiffs seek damages in addition to injunctive or declaratory relief, they often plead for a nominal
award only. See, e.g., id.; King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1274 (11 th Cir. 2003); Mellen
v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 363 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1750 (2004); Bonham v. Dist.
of Columbia Library Admin., 989 F.2d 1242, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Yacovelli v. Moeser, No.
1:02CV596, 2004 WL 1144183, at *10 (M.D.N.C. May 20, 2004). For a general discussion of the
difficulties faced by plaintiffs seeking damages in Establishment Clause cases, see Doug Rendleman,
Irreparability Resurrected?: Does a Recalibrated Irreparable Injury Rule Threaten the Warren
Court's Establishment Clause Legacy? 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1343, 1355-64 (2002).
174. See also Rendleman, supra note 173, at 1353 n.40 ("The other basic category of remedy,
restitution, hardly figures into constitutional remedies at all."); Mike Wells, Constitutional Reme-
dies, Section 1983 and the Common Law, 68 MISS. L.J. 157, 220 (1998) (noting the inadequate
deterrent effect of attorneys' fee awards under 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
175. Thomas I, supra note 172, at 725.
176. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 857, 896-99 (1999); Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion,
Inequality, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2455-59 (2003).
177. See, e.g., Note, Complex Enforcement: Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 626 (1981).
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prophylactic remedies 178 that "reach beyond the limits of the legal
violation to prohibit conduct that itself is permissible, but nevertheless
must be restricted in order to prevent future violations"'' 79 because "other
narrower remedies are ineffective due, for example, to . . . the
defendant's ability to evade a simple prohibition."' 80  In other
circumstances, the courts have embraced an incremental approach that
addresses only partially the web of conduct facilitating a constitutional
violation.18 ' These competing approaches to intractable constitutional
problems reflect sharply conflicting views regarding the practicality of
federal court supervision of complex institutional processes' 82 as well as
profound disagreement over the constitutional legitimacy of expansive
equitable decrees. 83
The unconstitutional display of permanent religious symbols
presents a very different question. Unlike the structural violations at
issue in desegregation or prison litigation, the illegality is typically a
discrete and concretely remediable event.' 84 The violation arises from a
single act of government in sanctioning the display of a religious symbol
on public property, and its remedy requires only the termination of the
endorsing relationship between government and the symbolic speech. 185
While one could envision a broad prophylactic remedy in this context-
e.g., an injunction prohibiting a particularly recalcitrant and repetitive
violator from displaying any religious imagery, to preclude the
possibility that another violation might ensue-the scenario is
implausible. Instead, the analytic task is to undo the violation itself
178. E.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 287-
88 (1977).
179. Thomas I, supra note 172, at 691-92.
180. Tracy A. Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies Through The Looking Glass of
Bush v. Gore, II WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343, 389 (2002) (hereinafter Thomas 11).
181. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,
301 (1955); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 598-606 (1983); cf Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
182. John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial Author-
ity of Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1122-23 (1996); Rendleman, supra note 173, at 1371;
cf Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91
HARv. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
183. Compare, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 454 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing), Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 124-33 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring), and Yoo, supra note
182, at 1141-66, with Thomas I, supra note 180, at 380-82, 389, and Levinson, supra note 176, at
900-01.
184. Rendleman, supra note 173, at 1373 ("[C]ourts that have devised plaintiffs' remedies for
officials' Establishment Clause infringements have not adduced logistical difficulties, separation of
powers, and federalism to justify delayed and partial relief.").
185. Cf id. at 1354 ("Judges grant structural injunctions for school desegregation, electoral
reform, and, more recently, prison condition remedies. Usually these tasks are bigger jobs than the
courts typically ask of Establishment Clause injunctions against religious observances.").
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through means of a preventive or reparative injunction. 18 6 The following
discussion focuses on the contours of such relief and thus bypasses the
wider debate over the power of the federal judiciary to impose broad
prophylactic decrees. While the remedies proposed below are more
demanding than the measures required by at least some of the courts that
have considered these issues,187 their scope corresponds to the parameters




The endorsement standard rests on the principle that government
may not communicate a message of political exclusion or inferiority to
religious nonadherents. 8 9  When a religious display violates the
Establishment Clause, injunctive relief must address directly and
eradicate completely that disaffecting injury. 190 Any remedy falling short
of this objective will exacerbate the harm by communicating that the
prohibition is a mere formality that the political establishment, through a
complicit judiciary, will render irrelevant in application.19' This is not an
abstract concern. In decisions addressing the remedial requirements of
the Establishment Clause in this context, several courts have sanctioned
ineffectual measures that trivialize rather than vindicate the constitutional
interests at stake.
19 2
This deficient jurisprudence derives, in part, from the absence of
any consistent methodology to frame the remedial inquiry. The courts
have instead produced a patchwork of ad hoc and often irreconcilable
dispositions' 9  reflecting a considerable disparity of analytic rigor.
194
186. Procedurally, a court may either issue a simple preventive injunction barring the contin-
ued endorsement of a religious symbol or delineate in greater detail the reparative steps required to
achieve that objective. In some cases, the remedy unfolds in two steps. The court first issues a
preventive injunction permitting the defendant to take whatever steps it deems appropriate to com-
ply. If the plaintiff believes that defendant's remedial efforts are inadequate, he or she then requests
the court to issue a modified reparative decree specifying the particular steps necessary to cure the
illegality. Compare, e.g., Murphy v. Bilbray, 782 F. Supp. 1420, 1438 (S.D. Cal. 1991), with Mur-
phy v. Bilbray, Nos. 90-0134-GT and 89-0820-GT, 1997 WL 754604 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1997).
187. See, e.g., infra notes 356-66 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 202-45 and accompanying text.
189. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Books v.
City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 308 (7th Cir. 2000).
190. Cf Thomas H, supra note 180, at 389.
191. Cf Levinson, supra note 176, at 914.
192. E.g., infra notes 356-66, 391-94.
193. See generally Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, Nos. 04-1321 and 04-1524, 2005 WL
81886 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2005); Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *12-*13 (Bauer, J., dissenting); Paulson
v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (decided under the California Consti-
tution); Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1134 (Fernandez, J., dissenting); Paulson v. City of San Diego, 262
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Some decisions require that permanent religious displays be removed
from public property,' 95 others merely require their relocation, 196 while
still others permit their sale along with a portion of the underlying public
land. 197 Some decisions authorize the sale of religious displays and the
underlying realty only on condition that the property be sold at open
auction without preference afforded purchasers seeking to preserve the
symbol,' 98 while others permit negotiated sales with buyers committed to
retaining the display. 199 The courts have diverged as well regarding the
amount of underlying land that must be sold to eradicate the appearance
of endorsement; some have closely scrutinized transactions involving
tiny parcels200 while others have expressed no concern over the size of
the transferred plot.z0l  Notably absent from this decisional law is any
effort to assess the specific requirements of the endorsement test in the
remedial context. The test, however, should squarely frame the analysis.
1. Level of Scrutiny
As a preliminary matter, the endorsement standard should be
understood to require close and skeptical consideration of any remedy
proposed by a government defendant.20 2  This demanding remedial
F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd en banc, 294 F.3d 1124; Kong v. City and County of San Francisco,
No. 00-15261, 2001 WL 1020102 (9th Cir. Sept. 5, 2001); Freedom From Religion Found. v. City of
Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2000); Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999 (W.D.
Wis. 2004), rev'd, 2005 WL 81886; Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 276 F. Supp. 2d 961 (W.D. Wis.
2003), rev'd, 2005 WL 81886; Paulson v. City of San Diego, Civ. No. 89-0820GT (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3,
2000), rev'd en banc, 294 F.3d 1124; Freedom From Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, No. 98-
C-270-S, 2000 WL 767376 (W.D. Wis. May 9, 2000); ACLU v. City of Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp.
2d 1024, 1036 (D. Neb. 2002); Murphy, 1997 WL 754604 (decided under the California Constitu-
tion); see also, Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1529-31 (9th Cir. 1993) (Beezer, J., concur-
ring); Separation of Church and State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 626 (9th Cir. 1996)
(O'Scannlain, J., concurring); Chambers, 292 F. Supp. at 772.
194. Compare, e.g., Kong, 2001 WL 1020102, City of Marshfield, 2000 WL 767376, and City
of Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1036, with Paulson, 294 F.3d 1124, and Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d
999 and 276 F. Supp. 2d 961.
195. Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1020-21.
196. City of Plattsnouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
197. Mercier, 2005 WL 81886; City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497; Kong, 2001 WL 1020102.
198. Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, at *10-*11.
199. Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *9; City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497.
200. Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, at *11; Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1019.
201. Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *9; City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497.
202. The endorsement standard generally requires that "government practices relating to
speech on religious topics 'must be subjected to careful judicial scrutiny,"' Capital Square Review
and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 778 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal citation
omitted), but the particular degree of scrutiny applicable in the remedial context has not been ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court. Among the lower courts, the Seventh Circuit has held that any pro-
posed remedy should be examined with respect to its "substance ... as well as its form to determine
whether government action endorsing religion has actually ceased." City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at
491.
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scrutiny is a necessary consequence of the endorsement test's relaxation
of the Lemon liability standard. While Lemon prohibited "aid" to
religion, the endorsement standard prohibits only such aid that
reasonably implies government's subjective embrace of a religious
beneficiary. 0 3 Having shifted the focus to government's actual or
perceived intentions-and in so doing limited the reach of the
constitutional prohibition-the new standard should be understood to
impose a greater remedial burden on government in those instances
where a violation is found. The need for greater scrutiny results from the
evident fact that government aid to religion, considered objectively
without regard to its apparent motivation or purpose, is more easily
undone than the perception that government is subjectively attached to a
religious beneficiary and seeks to promote its interests.
The concept of endorsement implies a particular type of intended
behavior.204 While objective conduct, without more, may give rise to a
perception of endorsement (e.g., affording religion superior access to
government benefits or resources), it does so by implying an underlying
purpose that itself is impermissible. 20 5  Conferring a comparative
advantage on religion offends the endorsement standard because it
suggests to the objective observer that government subjectively prefers
206or embraces a particular religious viewpoint. °6 The politically
disaffecting impact of prohibited conduct-the ultimate concern of the
endorsement inquiry-derives from its apparent motivation.207  A
constitutional violation thus rests on the conclusion that government, in
fact or appearance, has acted with the subjective intention of promoting
religion, not merely that it has unwittingly conferred some advantage
upon it.
To remedy such a violation requires that the apparent favoritism
itself be undone. Accordingly, courts must closely scrutinize the history
and context of any proposed remedy, beginning most obviously with the
underlying violation, to determine whether the corrective action will
eradicate the perceived endorsement, and specifically whether any
superficially neutral proposal is a subterfuge for subtle religious
preference. Justice O'Connor's admonition in Pinette is particularly
relevant in this regard: no circumstance more clearly justifies the
imposition of an "affirmative obligation[] . .. to take steps to avoid being
203. See supra notes 14-15, 21-22 and accompanying text.
204. Id.
205. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
206. Id.
207. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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perceived as supporting or endorsing a private religious message 20 8 than
a finding of endorsement itself, which demands a remedy that not merely
restores superficial neutrality but rather convinces the objective observer
that government's preferential sentiment no longer colors its conduct.
209
The analysis of the en banc court in Paulson v. City of San Diego
illustrates the distinction.210 In Paulson, the City of San Diego purported
to remedy its impermissible display of a Latin cross in the center of a
public park by auctioning the cross and a small parcel of the underlying
parkland on condition that all bidders agree to use the property as a war
memorial. 2 1  The city made clear that the existing cross satisfied the
war-memorial use restriction but that purchasers were not required to
212retain the symbol. In the district court and before the original three-
judge panel of the Ninth Circuit, the transaction was upheld on grounds
that it separated the city from the display in a manner that was
sufficiently neutral with respect to the religious expression at issue, since
the city did not require that the cross be preserved.213 On rehearing,
however, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit struck down the sale,
reasoning that the city conferred a material advantage on purchasers
seeking to retain the cross through the imposition of the war-memorial
use restriction. 214 As the court explained, only purchasers intending to
display the cross could satisfy the use restriction without further
investment; all others would be forced to incur the substantial additional
expense of removing the existing symbol and constructing a new
memorial in its place. 2t5 Forced to reserve funds for these expenditures,
bidders opposed to the cross had comparatively less money available
with which to purchase the property.1 6
While the en banc decision rests on a provision of the California
Constitution barring aid to religion,1 7 the Paulson court's reasoning
208. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 777.
209. Cf Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 381-82 (1997) (upholding injunction
barring otherwise protected expressive activity based on defendants' record of unlawful conduct);
Turner v. Habersham County, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
210. 294 F.3d 1124.
211. Paulson, 294 F,3d at 1127.
212. Id. at 1127, 1132.
213. Id. at 1128; Paulson, 262 F.3d at 894 ("Because the land was sold in an open bidding
process, with its express provision that the purchaser's intent to keep or remove the cross from the
property would not be considered in evaluating bids, any appearance of preference for religion is
dispelled.").
214. Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1132-33.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1133 n.7. The vacated panel decision affirmed the transaction on Establishment
Clause grounds as well as state constitutional grounds. Paulson, 262 F.3d at 891 n.3.
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properly reflects the endorsement inquiry in the remedial context. The
well-informed observer, knowledgeable of the city's long battle to "save"
the cross, 218 would scrutinize the transaction with far greater care than if
the proposal had been made in a different context-for example, if the
city had obtained the cross and surrounding parkland as a gift and had
immediately volunteered to conduct an auction to remove the symbol
from its newly acquired property.2 19  The endorsement standard's
historical and contextual analysis necessarily requires more searching
scrutiny of a proposed remedy than would be required in circumstances
where the relevant conduct is not the coerced response of political
officials to an adverse and often fiercely unpopular court order.
220 Aware
of government's embrace of religion and viewing subsequent conduct in
light of that offense, the objective observer will skeptically assess
218. Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1126.
219. A recent opinion of thc Seventh Circuit conversely implies that the analysis of remedies
under the Establishment Clause should be more lenient than the assessment of identical conduct
arising in a nonremedial context. Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *8. In upholding a highly suspect
remedial sale, see, e.g., infra notes 275, 363-66, 392-94 and accompanying text, the Mercier court
asserts that the remedial posture of the case lends justification to a land transfer that otherwise might
be barred as an endorsement violation. Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *8. The court stresses that it is
"not endorsing a non-remedial initiative designed to sell off patches of government land to various
religious denominations as a means of circumventing the Establishment Clause," id., but offers no
explanation why it should be permissible for government to do precisely the same thing in circum-
stances where it has refused to acknowledge the infirmity of its conduct, invited a constitutional
challenge, and lost. See id. at *2. As set forth above, a well-informed observer would likely view
the coerced remedial response of an entrenched defendant with considerably greater suspicion than
actions voluntarily taken by government in advance of litigation to resolve a constitutional concern.
220. Government officials often face significant political pressure to defend against challenges
to religious displays on public property, as illustrated by a recent controversy in Los Angeles. After
initially agreeing to a demand that the County of Los Angeles remove a cross from its official seal,
the Board of Supervisors faced "a massive public outcry," including "angry letters, e-mails and
phone calls [that] flooded" their offices along with a formal letter of protest from the Cardinal of the
Archdiocese of Los Angeles. Troy Anderson, Big Outcry Over Tiny Cross, L.A. DAILY NEWS, June
4, 2004. Government defendants facing such pressure often adopt a defiant public posture in re-
sponse to adverse judicial rulings. For example, a member of the San Diego County Board of Su-
pervisors publicly characterized a federal court order striking down a cross at the center of a County
park as "asinine" and "foolish ... in a nation where we are one nation under God." Transcript of
December 10, 1991 San Diego County Board of Supervisors Meeting, at 6, Ex. 18 to Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Modify and Enforce Injunction, Mur-
phy, 1997 WL 754604 (No. 90-0134-GT). Another member asserted that "the problem is . . .
frankly, an absurd court ruling by a judge who really is encouraging intolerance in our society." Id.
at 12. In the Paulson case, public officials responded to the initial order barring display of the cross
in a public park by launching a campaign to "save" the symbol through a negotiated sale to an entity
committed to its preservation. Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1126. Given the pressure brought to bear on
public officials in such cases, it is highly unlikely that an objective observer would embrace their
proposed remedies without exceedingly close review.
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corrective action to assure that superficially neutral means are not
employed to effectuate government's established religious preference.22'
2. Principles of Analysis: Separation and Neutrality
When government attempts to erase the perception of endorsement
arising from a permanent religious display on public land, its
"affirmative obligations" should be understood to encompass two
interrelated and demanding duties: (1) achieving evident and substantial
physical separation from the offending display (2) through means that are
strictly neutral with respect to the religious expression at issue.
Courts must carefully scrutinize any proposed remedy to assure that
both requirements are satisfied.222 A superficially neutral remedy that in
fact or appearance tends to favor religious speech perpetuates rather than
eliminates a message of endorsement, and thus not merely fails to
remedy the violation but also independently violates the constitutional
proscription.
223
a. The Futility of Message Dilution and the Corresponding
Necessity of Physical Separation
As Justice Souter explained in Pinette, a religious display on public
property-irrespective of its public or private sponsorship-implicates
the endorsement prohibition because an objective observer will likely
attribute the sectarian message to the owner of the underlying land.224 To
end that perception, government must either physically separate itself
from the display or transform the message of the imagery itself. Courts
have hypothesized three ways in which an endorsing message might be
diluted: by moving the display to another location on public land, 25 by
transforming the public property into a public forum for other permanent
displays, so that none enjoys preferential status,226 or by transforming the
display through the inclusion of additional items which purportedly
221. Cf Sue Fox & Karima A. Haynes, Debate Over Crosses on City Seals Hits a Nerve, L.A.
TIMES, June 11, 2004, at BI ("Erasing a cross, it now seems clear, is a politically perilous pursuit.
What began as a murmur ... swelled into a full-throated roar this month after the American Civil
Liberties Union . . . call[ed] the small cross on the [Los Angeles] county seal an unconstitutional
'endorsement of Christianity.' When county supervisors voted last week to abandon the cross, the
reaction was swift and furious. Thousands of people... flooded the supervisors with calls to keep
the cross.").
222. See supra notes 202-21 and accompanying text.
223. Cf Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1133-34 (remedial sale fails to cure original constitutional viola-
tion and independently violates California Constitution).
224. Pinete, 515 U.S. at 786 (Souter, J., concurring); City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491.
225. City ofPlattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
226. Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1020.
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secularize its message.227 Each of these proposed measures, however,
will fail to effectively dissipate the endorsing effect of a permanent
religious display, at least in the typical case.
Relocating a permanent display to other public property simply
shifts the unconstitutional message of endorsement to a new locale. In
assessing constitutional liability in the first instance, courts have ruled
consistently that the objective observer is deemed knowledgeable of the
ownership of public property-even if the land is not evidently
associated with government-and have struck down religious displays
irrespective of the location or nature of the public land upon which they
sit.22 8  In the remedial context, the objective observer's level of
knowledge regarding the ownership of the underlying property should be
deemed even more precise, for the reasons discussed previously.
229
Accordingly, it is difficult to envision any public property that might
constitutionally support the permanent display of an otherwise
impermissible sectarian symbol unless the symbol is placed in some
closed or inaccessible space that the public (and thus the objective
observer) cannot view. In any other public setting, the attribution of an
impermissible religious message to the owner of the underlying property
will not abate.
Likewise, the suggestion that government might remedy an
unconstitutional religious display by transforming its physical setting
into a public forum for permanent symbolic speech-thus permitting the
perpetual display of many different private symbols without regard to
content or viewpoint-is both practically implausible and analytically
suspect, for reasons set forth earlier.230  These shortcomings are
exacerbated in the remedial context, where an existing religious display
will likely occupy a desirable position within the larger physical space
and thus retain an inherent communicative advantage over other symbols
that might be added to the surrounding property. 231 For example, in a
number of cases involving permanent Latin crosses displayed in public
parks, the religious symbol sits at the center and often the apex of the
227. Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 489-90 (6th Cir. 2002); ACLU v. McCreary County, 145
F. Supp. 2d 845, 852-53 (E.D. Ky. 2001).
228. See, e.g., Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004).
229. Supra notes 202-21 and accompanying text.
230. Supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 496 ("The statue is an unattended object fifteen
feet in height and made of marble. For this reason alone, citizens who wish to endorse other relig-
ions or sects on 'equal terms' would find it exceedingly difficult to erect an object of equal expres-
sive power or to maintain it on government property.").
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public property. 32 Opening the surrounding slopes for the display of
other permanent imagery will not establish a true public forum, since the
original religious symbol will retain literal superiority over all other
speech and thus will continue to enjoy an expressive advantage.
Finally, the proposition that an impermissible religious display can
be contextually "secularized" by the inclusion of additional items within
the display itself is, at best, a limited remedial option that applies only to
imagery whose religious meaning is sufficiently mutable-for example,
a creche or an inscription of the Ten Commandments, both of which
have been construed by some courts as potentially historical rather than
religious representations, depending upon the manner of presentation.2
33
With respect to intrinsically sectarian symbols, such as a cross or Star of
David, the addition of secular items cannot alter the irreducibly religious
character of the original imagery. 34
The secularizing effect of an augmented display is also considerably
less potent in the remedial context, irrespective of the intensity of the
religious imagery at issue. As the Sixth Circuit observed in striking
down a revised display, "the [reasonable] observer is charged with
knowing the history of the respective displays, and in each case the
history indicates that the displays were originally intended to enshrine
the Ten Commandments; it was only upon fear of litigation that the
displays were modified to include secular material in the hope of
rendering the displays constitutional. 235 When otherwise impermissible
religious imagery is coercively "secularized" under threat of court order,
the objective observer will examine the revised display with heightened
scrutiny to assure that government has not simply draped the symbol in
secular dress to disguise its sectarian message.236 When viewed with
such skepticism, the remedial efficacy of augmenting an impermissible
232. Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1520-21 (Mt. Helix and Mt. Soledad crosses); Carpenter v. City and
County of San Francisco, 93 F.3d 627, 628, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Separation of Church & State
Comm., 93 F.3d at 618; Jewish War Veterans v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 3, 5 (D.D.C. 1998).
233. Supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 140; see, e.g., ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 459 (6th Cir.
2003).
235. McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 461; see Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1016; Turner, 290 F.
Supp. 2d at 1371; ACLU v. Rutherford County, 209 F. Supp. 2d 799, 808 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).
236. See, e.g., McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 459-61; Turner, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1371; cf
Adland, 307 F.3d at 486-87; Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 768-69, 771-73
(7th Cir. 2001); Books, 235 F.3d at 307; ACLU v. Grayson County, No. Civ.A.4:01CV-202-M, 2002
WL 1558688, at *4-*5 (W.D. Ky. May 13, 2002); ACLU v. Ashbrook, 211 F. Supp. 2d 873, 890-92
(N.D. Ohio 2002); ACLU v. Pulaski County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 691, 699-700 (E.D. Ky. 2000); Doe v.




display is necessarily diminished. Moreover, the premise of the
remedial proposal is itself subject to considerable criticism, as courts and
commentators have noted with regard to the corresponding analysis of
seasonal religious displays.
238
Accordingly, at least with respect to intrinsically sectarian symbols
(and arguably with respect to less intensive religious imagery as well),
the only practical alternative is to physically separate government from
the unconstitutional display. Such separation can be achieved in two
ways: removing the offending display or privatizing the land beneath it.
Removing an impermissible symbol is a direct and effective remedy that
unmistakably achieves the required separation. 39  Privatizing the
underlying land is less straightforward and requires additional analysis of
the particular characteristics of the transferred parcel and its relationship
to the remaining public land, if any. As discussed below, a remedial sale
must achieve both evident and substantial separation from adjacent
public property to affirm the interests of the Establishment Clause.2
40
b. The Accompanying Requirement of Strict Neutrality
Achieving evident and substantial physical separation between
government and an impermissible display is a necessary but not
sufficient remedial goal. Additionally, such separation must be achieved
through means that are strictly neutral with respect to the religious
expression at issue. For example, it accomplishes very little to sell land
underlying a religious display on terms that prohibit the purchaser from
displacing the symbol; while physical separation may be achieved,
government has done nothing to dissipate its disaffecting promotion of
the religious message.
237. Id. For example, a solitary display of the Ten Commandments that is later supplemented
with secular material is more likely to accord the original text a place of prominence-and less likely
to coherently integrate it with the various surrounding items-than a display designed from the
outset to reflect the interrelation and significance of multiple texts. The inclusion of Moses as a
lawgiver among many others on the frieze above the Supreme Court's courtroom stands in contrast
to the tactical addition, in the midst of litigation, of secular items to a longstanding religious display.
Compare, e.g., ACLU v. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573, 652-53 (1989), with McCreary
County, 354 F.3d at 454, 460.
238. See, e.g., Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 170 (5th Cir. 1991) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting) (prevailing analysis immerses judges "in the minutiae of graphic design, our rulers and
calipers in hand, scrutinizing each symbol for acceptable proportion, color, and gloss"); Am. Jewish
Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); Laura
Ahn, Note, This is Not a Crhche, 107 YALE L.J. 1969 (1998).
239. Infra notes 281-85 and accompanying text.
240. Infra notes 327-66 and accompanying text.
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As the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed over the last half
century, "[a] proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the
Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of
'neutrality' towards religion, favoring neither one religion over others
,,24 1nor religious adherents collectively over nonadherents. While the
principle of neutrality is thus embedded in Establishment Clause
doctrine, the Court has struggled to apply it in a manner that properly
distinguishes between impermissible benefits conferred upon religion
and the permissible accommodation of private religious practice.2 42 In
the remedial context, however, the neutrality principle must be strictly
construed to assure that preferential treatment of religious expression is
completely extinguished. In those instances where government purports
to remedy a violation through the privatization of an endorsed display,
any accommodation of the sectarian symbol must be subject to searching
scrutiny, as discussed above,243  to assure that the rhetoric of
accommodation is not employed to subtly perpetuate government's
established preference. Accommodations in the remedial context thus
should be permitted only if they afford endorsed religious speech no
244expressive advantage vis a vis competing private viewpoints . To
otherwise permit government to project its perceived favoritism into the
sphere of private expression will perpetuate rather than dissipate
apparent endorsement in the view of a skeptical observer.245
This understanding of religious accommodation in relation to the
remedial inquiry is consistent with the respective constitutional interests
at play. The accommodation of private religious practice arises from the
free exercise and free speech rights of individuals and entities who might
otherwise be thwarted in the expression of their faith.246 While relevant
to the construction of the endorsement prohibition,247 these constitutional
241. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S 687, 696 (1994) (citations
and internal quotations omitted); see, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992); Allegheny,
492 U.S. at 592-94; Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 60 (1985); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437, 450 (1971); Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963); Tor-
caso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
242. See supra note 62.
243. Supra notes 202-21 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 60-65; cf infra notes 283-85 and accompanying text (discussion of a
permissible remedial accommodation).
245. Infra notes 367-413 and accompanying text; cf Pinette, 515 U.S. at 766.
246. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In cases involving the lifting of
government burdens on the free exercise of religion, a reasonable observer would take into account
the value underlying the Free Exercise Clause in assessing whether the challenged practice conveyed




interests "do[] not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the
Establishment Clause., 248  Thus, where an Establishment Clause
violation has occurred, a court must first assure that the perception of
endorsement has been eradicated before turning to the constitutional
interests associated with the newly privatized speech. The process of
privatizing an impermissible display is itself state action that must
comport with the dictates of the Establishment Clause;
249 the interests
arising from the recipient's resulting ownership are contingent upon, not
independent of, the legality of the preceding transfer.
2 5 0 Unless and until
government effectively remedies its apparent religious preference by
transferring a symbol to private hands in a strictly neutral fashion, a
private recipient's free exercise and free speech rights remain inchoate.
Two decisions have addressed the relationship of the Establishment
Clause and the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses in this context-
the Seventh Circuit's opinion in City of Marshfield and the original panel
decision of the Ninth Circuit in Paulson.
251  In Paulson, the court
appeared to accept the proposition that the free exercise and free speech
rights associated with a privatized religious display are contingent upon
the constitutional validity of the preceding remedy.
252 The court's
analysis of the "legitima[cy], 253 of the remedy, however, ignored
significant preferential features of the transaction
254 and thus sanctioned
a substantive outcome that still elevated the expressive interests of the
private recipient.2 55  The other relevant decision-Freedom From
Religion Foundation v. City of Marshfield-is less clear in its analysis.
The court states "that because our holding limits private speech in a
public forum, any remedy must be narrowly tailored to avoid an
Establishment Clause violation., 256  To the extent this suggests that a
248. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587; see, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302
(2000); Pinene, 515 U.S. at 775-76 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch.
Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1101, 1104 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000).
249. See infra notes 307-26 and accompanying text.
250. This result corresponds with basic principles of property law, which require that a pur-
chaser with "actual notice of the pendency of [a] proceeding" take the property "subject to any
judgment that may be rendered" in the action. Albertson v. Raboff, 295 P.2d 405, 408 (Cal. 1956);
see CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1908(a)(2) (West 2004); see also Duncan v. Farm Credit Bank, 940
F.2d 1099, 1101 (7th Cir. 1991) (state lispendens rules govern federal court proceedings).
251. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487; Paulson, 262 F.3d 885.
252. Paulson, 262 F.3d at 896 ("[Blecause the land was legitimately sold to the private Asso-
ciation, we must recognize and protect the Association's rights of Free Exercise and Free Speech as
the Constitution demands no less.").
253. Id.
254. See supra notes 210-16.
255. Id.; Paulson, 262 F.3d at 891-6.
256. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497.
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remedial order respecting the transfer of an impermissible display must
be narrowly drawn for the purpose of facilitating the resulting private
religious expression, it conflates separate constitutional interests that
should be addressed distinctly and sequentially. In so doing, the analysis
invites the preferential treatment of religious speech, at least where the
required remedial "narrowing" is achieved at the expense of strict
neutrality.
Equitable remedies must be tailored to address the illegality at
hand. 7  In the Establishment Clause context, this maxim requires that
remedial orders reach no further than necessary to dispel the appearance
of endorsement. 258  Among its potential consequences, an excessively
broad remedy might impair a private recipient's ability to engage in
protected religious expression, and a court should assess such an effect in
determining the scope of remedial measures. 9  Any constitutional
excess, however, can only be determined by first establishing the
baseline requirements of the Establishment Clause and then measuring
the remedial proposal against that benchmark. Those requirements
demand that government first separate itself from an unconstitutional
display through means that are strictly neutral with respect to endorsed
symbolic speech.
B. The Remedial Analysis
Because there are two alternative means to achieve physical
separation-removal of an impermissible symbol and privatization of the
property beneath it-the first step of the remedial analysis is to establish
whether government defendants are free to choose between the two in
every case. While in many instances both alternatives are permissible,
provided that certain rigorous safeguards are met, there are at least two
circumstances in which courts should require that displays be removed
rather than sold with the underlying public land. After addressing this
threshold question, the remaining task is to determine the specific
requirements of the separation and neutrality principles for each of the
two remedial options.
260
257. 1 IA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2955 (2d ed. 1995) ('The primary objection to broad injunctive orders is
the fear that they will impose unnecessary restraints on individual freedom and prohibit lawful and
socially desirable activity. In particular, a court must be cautious in framing a broad injunction lest
it prohibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights."); FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) ("Every order
granting an injunction... shall be specific in terms .... ").
258. Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 624-25 (7th Cir. 1992) (Cudahy, J., concurring).
259. See, e.g., infra note 361.
260. This analysis does not consider the special case of symbols held in trust by government,
which require sui generis remedies that reflect the unique interplay of trust law with the endorsement
standard. Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1529-30 (Beezer, J., concurring). The discussion presumes instead that
government has an exclusive interest in the public property at issue and thus that its constitutional
duties alone will shape the remedy. In circumstances where the property is held in trust, however,
the grantor may impose restrictions on the use and disposition of trust property that also must be
[Vol. 82:2
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1. Achieving Physical Separation: The Initial Remedial Choice
The most direct remedy in cases involving impermissible religious
displays is to remove the symbol. Removing a display achieves
complete physical separation between government and the offending
object and thus addresses the concern at the core of such disputes-
nonadherents' ability to use public space without the disaffecting
influence of the endorsed religious symbol. In many earlier cases,
including litigation involving large structures such as crosses, this
remedy was ordered without discernible controversy or 
opposition. 261
However, defendants increasingly seek to avoid the remedy by
attempting to sell or transfer religious symbols and the land beneath them
262
to private parties. 2 2 In the general case, this alternative remedy satisfies
the requirements of the Establishment Clause provided that certain
stringent conditions are met.263  However, there are at least two
assessed in determining an appropriate resolution. Id. Where the trustor demands that a religious
symbol remain on trust property, for example, and retains a reversionary interest to assure that the
command is respected, the objective observer likely will take a quite different view of a remedy
designed to preserve the symbol than in circumstances where government acts alone to perpetuate a
religious display. For those interested in the complex questions raised by this unusual intersection of
trust law and the Establishment Clause, the parties' briefing in Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, addresses
the issue in considerable detail.
261. See, e.g., Eugene Cross Now in Place on Bible College Campus, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
June 26, 1997 (describing removal and relocation of cross at issue in Separation of Church & State
Comm., 93 F.3d 617); Andrew Herrmann, Indiana Township Ends Fight to Keep Crucifix in Park,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 13, 1993 (describing decision to remove from public park the crucifix chal-
lenged in Gonzales v. North Township of Lake County, 4 F.3d 1412 (7th Cir. 1993)); Susan Jacob-
son, St. Cloud Man Bears Legacy of Cross Fight, OSCEOLA SENTINEL, Sept. 13, 1991 (describing
plaintiffs success in "forc[ing] the city to remove a cross from its water tower' in Mendelson v. City
of St. Cloud, 719 F Supp. 1065 (M.D. Fla. 1989)); Alan Sverdlik, Guerrero Goes to Washington,
ATLANTA J.-CoNST., May 31, 1989 (reporting that the decision in ACLU v. Rabun County Chamber
of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098 (1 ith Cir. 1983), "forced Georgia officials to remove an illumi-
nated cross from the Black Rock Mountain campgrounds"); Judy Wiessler, Order to Remove Star,
Crosses at Park Stands, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 12, 1985 (documenting order to remove cross and
Star of David at issue in ACLU v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Tex. 1984)); Jewish War Veterans,
695 F. Supp. at 4 ("[T]he Court is compelled to require that the [65-foot tall Latin] cross be removed
or replaced by a nonreligious symbol."). Several cases involving Ten Commandments displays have
also resulted in orders requiring their removal. See, e.g., Ashbrook, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 896; Grayson
County, 2002 WL 1558688, at *6; ACLU v. Hamilton County, 202 F. Supp. 2d 757, 767 (E.D. Tenn.
2002); Kimbley v. Lawrence County, 119 F. Supp. 2d 856, 876 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Pulaski County, 96
F. Supp. 2d at 702-03; ACLU v. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 691 (E.D. Ky. 2000);
Harlan County Sch. Dist., 96 F. Supp. 2d at 679; see generally, Dan Popkey, Former Eagles Official
Likes Monument Solution, THE IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 28, 2004 ("At least 26 monuments in 15
states have moved since 2000 under court order or legal threat.").
262. Buono, 371 F.3d at 545-46 (describing transfer of cross property during pendency of
appeal); Kong, 2001 WL 1020102 (analyzing sale of Mt. Davidson cross property); Ellis, 990 F.2d at
1528-29 (describing transfer of Mt. Soledad and Mt. Helix crosses and underlying property to pri-
vate parties during pendency of appeal); Murphy, 1997 WL 754604 (analysis of transfers); Paulson,
294 F.3d 1124 (analysis of second sale of Mt. Soledad cross); Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1009-21
and 276 F. Supp. 2d at 974-78 (analyzing sale of Ten Commandments monument and underlying
property during pendency of litigation); Chambers, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (property transfer con-
ducted to avert constitutional challenge).
263. See infra notes 327-434 and accompanying text.
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circumstances where the removal of a religious display, rather than the
transfer of land beneath it, should be required.26
a. Displays That Must Be Removed
Privatization of the public fora typically at issue in cases involving
permanent religious displays265 represents a largely noneconomic loss to
the public, whose aesthetic, expressive, and recreational enjoyment of the
property is permanently impaired or prohibited.266 The privatization of a
public forum, for example, forever removes from the public's reach a
unique venue for expressive activity. This loss cannot be measured
economically and thus cannot be compensated through payment of a sum
of money-particularly to the government itself, which is often the
critical focus of the expressive activities that no longer can occur. Just as
the deprivation of expressive rights gives rise to an award of nominal
damages only, given that the loss cannot be expressed economically,267
so too the loss of a public forum cannot be fully captured and
compensated monetarily. When government chooses to privatize public
property of this nature, there is a compensation gap in the transaction-a
loss of value to the public that is not captured by payment of the
purchase price. Presuming that the sale is rational, that gap must be
closed by the realization of other noneconomic objectives of equivalent
value to the political community.
While government is entitled to close public fora rather than
continue to accommodate private speech,268 any effort to do so must
264. Given the fact-intensive nature of the endorsement inquiry, there also may be situations
where the specific history and context of a particular display requires its removal in a case that falls
outside the circumstances set forth below. For example, in the Paulson case, the federal courts have
already struck down two remedial attempts by the city to sell the cross at issue based on the conclu-
sion that both transactions evinced religious preference. Paulson, 294 F.3d 1124; Murphy, 1997 WL
754604. The City Attorney has now proposed a third sale. Matthew T. Hall, A New Idea for Mt.
Soledad-Leave Decision To A New Buyer, SAN DtF.Go UNION-TRIB., June 29, 2004, at B 1. If the
transaction goes forward, its communicative impact cannot be assessed without reference to this
tainted history. Cf Mercier, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 979 ("At this point, selling a larger section of the
park or putting up more signs and disclaimers would fail to communicate a genuine message that the
endorsement has ended.").
265. The phrase "public fora," as used in this context, does not describe public property that
has been opened for permanent symbolic speech, in contrast to the remedial proposal discussed
above. Supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text. It instead describes the typical setting of im-
permissible religious displays in parks, plazas, and other public spaces that are traditionally held
open for temporary expressive use. These spaces are almost never openly available for permanent
symbolic expression, but instead contain selected displays that reflect-in fact or appearance-the
endorsement and often the express sponsorship of government itself.
266. This is especially true in light of the requirements for a constitutional sale, which mandate
that sufficient property be transferred to eradicate the appearance of endorsement. See infra notes
338-66 and accompanying text. Because a significant amount of public land must be transferred, the
public's loss of access will likely be substantial.
267. Allah v. AI-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2000); Risdal v. Halford, 209 F.3d 1071,
1071-72 (8th Cir. 2000); Trewhella v. City of Lake Geneva, 249 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1069-70 (E.D.
Wis. 2003).
268. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 783-84 (Souter, J., concurring).
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itself be free from the appearance of endorsement.269 In the context of
land sales proposed to remedy an unconstitutional religious display, any
equalizing noneconomic value realized by the political community must
derive from an objective that is independent of, and neutral toward, the
display at issue. It cannot be enough for government to inflict this loss-
which could be avoided altogether by removing the display-simply in
the hope of preserving a religious symbol in its original location. That
objective, standing alone, promotes no independent and neutral goal of
value to the entire community, but instead reflects yet another special
benefit bestowed on religious expression. 270 As the district court in
Mercier v. City of La Crosse observed, "[ilf anything, the sale ...
exacerbates the violation because it communicates to nonadherents that
not only is the City willing to display a Judeo-Christian symbol on public
property, but it is also willing to carve up a public park to insure that the
symbol does not have to be moved or share its space with displays
expressing other viewpoints."
271
If, however, the relocation of a religious symbol cannot be
accomplished without significantly diminishing its communicative
effect, other neutral concerns are then in play-most importantly,
government's interest in promoting religious tolerance through the
respectful treatment of the icons of private faith. Two circumstances
implicate such an impairment of the expressive effect of a religious
symbol: where removal risks damaging or destroying the symbol itself,
and where the expressive force of the symbol is inextricably tied to its
269. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491; cf RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NLMMER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 8:51 ("[A] more difficult question is whether general First Amendment
principles prohibiting viewpoint discrimination are sufficiently hale to prohibit a governmental
entity from closing down a public forum in direct retaliation against a particular group's expressive
message."). For purposes of free speech analysis, there is an important distinction between the
closure of a public forum to all expression to avert the necessity of accommodating offensive speech
and the closure of a public forum so that one preferred expressive symbol might remain. While the
former results in no speech whatsoever, the latter results in the perpetuation of a single viewpoint.
Cf Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 316 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1231-32 (D. Utah 2004) (in
challenge to non-remedial sale of public forum property to religious organization, court rejects free
speech objection on grounds, inter alia, that transaction reflects no viewpoint preference for pur-
chaser). Moreover, at least where a forum is closed by a remedial sale-the intent of which is to rid
government of the appearance that it favors a particular religious viewpoint-the regulatory premise
of the sale itself should subject the transaction to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause. Cf First
Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1124 (10th Cir. 2002) (government's
subjective intent in regulating expressive activity relevant in determining degree of scrutiny).
270. As discussed more fully below, infra notes 367-94 and accompanying text, no sale of
public property to remedy an unconstitutional religious display can rest on the requirement that the
purchaser preserve the religious symbol. However, even in the absence of such an express require-
ment, a sale whose only discernible purpose is to preserve the possibility that the symbol might
remain still lacks an independent and neutral rationale.
271. Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1013; see also id. at 1020 (sale of entire park "could be prob-
lematic if the sale's only purpose was to maintain the monument's location and continue the promo-
tion of its message").
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particular physical setting (irrespective of the endorsing effect of public
ownership).
272
The first scenario would apply to large fixtures on public land such
as the crosses at issue in the Carpenter, Ellis, and Paulson cases;
evidence in Paulson specifically indicated that the Mt. Soledad cross
could not be removed without risking its destruction. 273  If government
must literally tear down a religious symbol to remove it from public land,
that unavoidably provocative act and the apparent hostility it manifests
toward religion may fuel private religious animosity that is in the interest
of all members of the political community-adherents and nonadherents
alike-to avert. The second scenario would likewise apply to the display
of large religious symbols, such as crosses, whose communicative impact
is linked to their ability to be seen from afar. Relocating a 50-foot cross
from a hilltop to a less prominent vantage will appreciably diminish its
communicative power-and if government so requires, it risks
communicating a message of disrespect for the diminished symbolic
expression. By contrast, moving a Ten Commandments monument
between the same two points will have no such diminishing effect, since
its communicative effect requires that the audience be close enough to
read the engraved text and is therefore unrelated to its particular physical
placement.274
In sum, when the communicative power of a religious symbol will
be substantially diminished if it is removed and relocated to private land,
government has an independent and neutral basis to sell the underlying
property in the interest of averting private religious strife. When a
symbol can be moved without any significant impairment of its
272. It is important to note that these scenarios would permit, but not require, government to
sell land beneath a religious display. Government may choose to remove the display instead, even if
the symbol's communicative force is diminished as a result. Defendants have argued that to remove
a display in such circumstances is constitutionally impermissible under the Free Exercise Clause.
See, e.g., Updated Brief by the Mt. Soledad Memorial Association, at *10-*11, Paulson, 294 F.3d
1124 (No. 00-55406), available at 2002 WL 32099878. Free exercise, however, must be asserted
against the government, not on its behalf. At least with respect to religious symbols erected by
government, there can be no constitutional objection. Alternatively, if the display was erected on
public land by private parties, the question of ownership must first be resolved-and in the case of
the large symbols at issue here, they are likely to be deemed fixtures upon the land and thus the
property of the landowner. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 660 (West 2004). Even if the symbol itself
is deemed the property of a private individual or entity, however, government can require its re-
moval as owner of the underlying land. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1013 (West 2004). The Free
Exercise Clause cannot give a private individual who erects an unconstitutional religious display on
public land an effective right to occupy the parcel in perpetuity and to force a closed sale of public
forum property to accomplish that result.
273. Defendant City of San Diego's Brief at 2 n.1, Murphy, 1997 WL 754604 (No. 89-0820-
GT).
274. The operation of this principle has the counter-intuitive effect of providing a more ac-
commodating remedy for larger and more entrenched displays, and thus would appear to reward
violations of greater magnitude. That legitimate perception must be factored into the analysis of
apparent endorsement and underscores the significance of the other stringent conditions that must be




expressive force, however, government has no such basis to deprive the
public of its use and enjoyment of the surrounding property.27 5
b. Public Property That Cannot Be Sold
Even if a religious symbol cannot be relocated without significantly
diminishing its expressive force, there is at least one situation where
removal still must be required. This circumstance involves a religious
display on property that is so intrinsically public in character, and so
closely enmeshed with the political community's self-identity, that any
sale of the land itself would evince actual or apparent endorsement of the
religious expression at issue. There are some public spaces that are
literally invaluable to the political community; to sell them for any price
communicates a message to nonadherents that government will go to any
length, and sacrifice anything, to preserve the religious symbol in its
present location. Were a cross displayed on the grounds of the Lincoln
Memorial, for instance, or on Inspiration Point overlooking Yosemite
Valley, the sale of land surrounding the display on any terms would
communicate to the political community that its most cherished physical
space may be bartered away in the service of a religious message.
276 The
countervailing neutral considerations supporting a sale in many
circumstances 277 are overwhelmed in such instances by the magnitude of
the public's noneconomic loss-a sacrifice so facially disproportionate
that it can only be understood as an expression of endorsement.
2 78
Glassroth v. Moore279 is the obvious case. There, the state of
Alabama has only one permissible remedy to cure its unconstitutional
placement of a two-ton Ten Commandments monument in the foyer of
its Supreme Court building, even if the display cannot be moved without
impairing its communicative effect.280  Any attempt to sell the land
underlying the monument, for any price, communicates that the state
would rather auction off the seat of its highest court than disrupt the
display of a sectarian text. The determination whether any particular
275. The one remedial sale that clearly offends this principle was struck down by the district
court but upheld on appeal in an opinion that addresses none of the considerations discussed above.
Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1004-05, rev'd, 2005 WL 81886. In another transaction, where the court
upheld the sale of land beneath a 15-foot marble statue of Jesus Christ, the record does not reveal
whether the display could have been moved without damage. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 489,
497; see also Buono, 371 F.3d at 545 (land underlying small cross to be transferred into private
hands).
276. This result may be mandated independently by statutory provisions governing the sale of
national monuments, public parks, and historic landmarks. See generally, Johanna H. Wald, The
Presidio Trust and our National Parks: Not a Model to be Trusted, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
369 (1998) (describing unsuccessful legislative attempts during the 104th Congress to ease restric-
tions on the sale of national park property).
277. See supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text.
278. Cf Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *9 ("Obviously, a city could not sell space under the
dome of its City Hall or the sidewalk in front of the courthouse steps. Such sale would be, on its
face, a sham.").
279. 335 F.3d 1282 (11 th Cir. 2003).
280. See Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1284.
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parcel meets this standard is necessarily fact-bound, turning on the
particular nature of the physical space and the court's subjective
determination of its significance to the public. Nevertheless, the
principle is not unbounded; for example, it would almost certainly
exclude typical municipal parkland and conversely include national
parks, monuments, and historic landmarks as well as the seats of local,
state, and national government.
2. The Easy Remedy: Removing a Religious Display
The removal of an impermissible symbol unambiguously separates
government from endorsed religious speech. Accordingly, the only
remedial question is whether the removal has been accomplished with
sufficiently strict neutrality. The neutrality inquiry is specifically linked
to the source of financing for the religious display.
Where an offending display has been privately financed, the symbol
need only be returned to its donor for relocation.28' Because government
did not expend funds to obtain or construct the symbol, it need not
receive compensation for returning the object--even if formal ownership
of the property has been transferred to government. The well-informed
observer, focusing on the substance of the transaction rather than the
formality of title, would perceive no actual or apparent benefit conferred
on religion by simply returning a donated symbol to its original
purchaser, even if government could have sold the object for gain.
Religion receives no preferential benefit when government foregoes a
windfall and instead returns a gift of religious property.282
The more difficult case involves the removal of symbols that
government itself has purchased or constructed. In such cases, donating
the symbol to a private entity for display elsewhere would constitute an
impermissible gift of public resources in support of religious speech.283
If government chooses to transfer the symbol to a private entity, it thus
must receive fair market value to compensate the public for its
investment. However, government need not obtain that value through an
open auction. Because the value of the property relates exclusively to its
expressive content, the only purpose of an open auction would be to
preserve the possibility that someone opposed to the display might
purchase it with the intention of suppressing that expression by either
destroying the symbol or otherwise limiting its communicative reach.
Precluding the suppression of private religious speech, however, does not
confer any special benefit on religion or reflect an impermissible
281. See, e.g., Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1002, 1018.
282. Id. at 1014 ("I agree that the City would not violate the establishment clause simply be-
cause it chose to return the property to its original owner rather than another interested party.").
283. E.g., Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 930-31 (3d Cir. 1980); Annunziato v.




preference; it instead advances government's neutral interest in
promoting religious tolerance by averting the denigration of private
religious imagery.284  It accordingly should be permissible for
government to sell the symbol through a negotiated transaction with a
purchaser committed to preserving the display, provided that the fair
market value of the object is recovered.8 5
3. The Difficult Remedy: Selling a Display and the Land Beneath It
In a number of recent cases involving large crosses or religious
statuary, and in another involving a Ten Commandments monument,
defendants have declined to remove religious symbols and have instead
proposed to remedy the violations by selling or transferring the
underlying land.286  Other municipalities have recently sold property
beneath religious displays in an effort to avert litigation.287 Privatizing
the underlying property has the obvious political virtue of preserving the
religious display in its original location, undisturbed but for the formality
of title. Precisely because the remedy is potentially a mere
recharacterization of title with little or no substantive effect on the
perception of governmental endorsement, any proposed sale or transfer
requires significantly greater scrutiny than the removal of an offending
display.
As discussed above, the sale of property beneath a challenged
religious symbol should be permitted only when the removal and
relocation of the display will significantly impair its communicative
force and only if the property at issue is not invaluably public in
288character. Within these constraints, several additional conditions must
be met for a sale to satisfy the requirements of the Establishment Clause.
While proponents of such sales argue that the mere fact of privatization
ends the controversy without further inquiry into the terms of the
transaction, the remedial logic of the endorsement test requires
substantially closer review.
284. E.g., Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1021 ("The City may respect the 'religious sensibilities'
of its citizens who follow the Ten Commandments by giving the [donated] monument to a person or
group that wishes to give the monument the respectful display that it deserves in another forum.").
285. By contrast, the sale of the land beneath a religious display must be done through an open
process, see infra notes 378-79 and accompanying text, because the property can be put to many
different uses. Most obviously, the sale of real property allocates permanent access to a venue for all
manner of private expression. Government cannot permit only those whose expressive intentions
coincide with its own to participate as potential purchasers.
286. See supra note 262.
287. See, e.g., George W. Griggs, High-Profile Cross for Sale in Simi, L.A. TIMES, May 29,
2004, at B I ("Seeking to avoid a lawsuit, Simi Valley park officials plan to sell a 12-foot cross that
has stood atop Mt. McCoy... for more than 60 years .... The Simi Valley Historical Society...
offered to buy the cross a year ago ... to ensure it remained a fixture in the community .... [The
transaction was arranged] after a recent controversy erupted in Ventura over a cross that had stood
for decades in city-owned Grant Park. Acting under the threat of a lawsuit, the city sold the cross in
September for $104,000 to a local historic preservation group.").
288. Supra notes 265-80 and accompanying text.
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a. Preliminary Arguments: Mootness and State Action
In several cases involving unconstitutional religious displays,
defendants have sold property beneath religious symbols during the
pendency of litigation and then argued that the transaction ends the
controversy, irrespective of the terms of the sale, on grounds of mootness
or the termination of state action. The argument is at odds with both
doctrines.
(1) Does a Sale Necessarily Moot the Case?
The broadest mootness argument made in this context contends that,
irrespective of the constitutionality of the sale or the question whether it
remedies any preceding violation of the Establishment Clause, changed
circumstances render the case moot and require new litigation if
plaintiffs wish to challenge the transaction. 289  The claim, typically
asserted following entry of a permanent injunction and designed to
preclude appellate review, 29 conflicts with basic principles of equitablejurisdiction.
It is a tenet of equity that "the spirit and purpose of an injunction,
not merely its precise words ... must be obeyed."29' In ascertaining the
requirements of an equitable command, "[t]he language of an injunction
must be read in the light of the circumstances surrounding its entry: the
relief sought by the moving party... and the mischief that the injunction
seeks to prevent." 292 In applying these principles to efforts by a party to
thwart or otherwise evade an injunctive decree, "courts have inherent
equitable power to modify their injunctions to ensure that any injunctive
relief granted fully vindicates the rights accorded by the underlying
judgment. 293 This power derives from the principle that "[e]quitable
jurisdiction having once attached, it will be continued for the final
adjudication of all rights involved and thus avoid further litigation in the
future ....294 Once "a court of equity has ... obtained jurisdiction, it
289. See, e.g., Appellant's Supplemental Reply Brief at 3-4, Buono, 371 F.3d 543 (No. 03-
55032) ("any challenge.., to the land transfer ... must be brought in a new action .... Whether...
the land transfer itself violate[s] the First Amendment [is an] issue[] that cannot be raised in this
case, but must be the subject of a new lawsuit.").
290. See, e.g., Buono, 371 F.3d at 545; but see Mercier, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 971-72 (sale follow-
ing filing of complaint alleged to moot dispute).
291. Nat'l Research Bureau, Inc. v. Kucker, 481 F. Supp. 612, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see, e.g.,
Youakim v. McDonald, 71 F.3d 1274, 1283 (7th Cir. 1995); Pridgen v. Andresen, 891 F. Supp. 733,
740 (D. Conn. 1995); Ruiz v. McCotter, 661 F. Supp. 112, 144 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
292. United States v. Christie Indus., Inc., 465 F.2d 1002, 1007 (3d Cir. 1972); see Youakim,
71 F.3d at 1283.
293. Transp., Inc. v. Mayflower Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 952, 954 (4th Cir. 1985); see, e.g.,
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 251-52 (1968); Taylor v. United States,
181 F.3d 1017, 1033 (9th Cir. 1999); Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1531 (Beezer, J., concurring); Larken Minne-
sota, Inc. v. Wray, 881 F. Supp. 1413, 1419-20 (D. Minn. 1995), aftd, No. 95-2219, 1996 WL
362672 (8th Cir. July 1, 1996).
294. G. L. CLARK, EQUITY § 24 at 35 (1954).
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will do complete justice by deciding the whole case and determining the
whole controversy. 295
When defendants seek to escape the reach of an injunction by
selling the property beneath an enjoined display, these principles are
applicable. To "decid[e] the whole case and determin[e] the whole
controversy, ''296 a court must conduct a substantive review of the
transaction to confirm that the underlying constitutional violation has
indeed been eradicated and that the sale itself does not independently
offend constitutional norms. Only after establishing that the transaction
satisfies the constitutional and remedial requirements imposed by the
Establishment Clause may a court sitting in equity terminate its decree.
A less sweeping variant of the changed-circumstances argument
contends that the sale of land beneath a religious symbol constitutes the
voluntary cessation of illegal conduct and therefore moots the case.
Unlike the broader argument, this contention presumes that the sale does,
in fact, terminate all illegality and therefore presupposes that the court
will examine the transaction to establish its constitutional and remedial
adequacy. If the sale survives this substantive review, defendants must
additionally establish to a very high degree of certainty that the illegality
will not recur once the suit is dismissed.
The Supreme Court instructs that "[m]ere voluntary cessation of
allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case; it if did, the courts would
be compelled to leave 'the defendant . . . free to return to his old
ways.' 97 The two-part standard to secure a dismissal is accordingly
stringent. Defendants must establish that "(1) 'subsequent events [have]
made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior [cannot]
reasonably be expected to recur,' and (2) 'interim relief or events have
completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged
violation.' 298 In meeting this standard, "[t]he defendant's burden is a
heavy one to ensure the allegedly illegal activities do not temporarily
cease only to resume after the claims have been dismissed. 299
With respect to the first prong, courts have paid considerable
attention to whether the voluntary cessation occurs only after an adverse
judgment has been entered against the defendant. 300 In such
circumstances, even changes that are the product of legislative enactment
295. McKevitt v. City of Sacramento, 203 P. 132, 138 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921).
296. McKevitt, 203 P. at 138.
297. United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968) (quoting
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953)); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 174 (2000).
298. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1274 (9th Cir. 1998)
(internal citations omitted); see, e.g., Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1035 (6th Cir. 2003);
Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Town of Orange, 303 F.3d 450, 451 (2d Cir. 2002).
299. Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep't, 352 F.3d 565, 574 (2d Cir. 2003).
300. Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003).
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rather than the exercise of administrative discretion are not always
considered sufficiently irreversible to satisfy the test.30' Thus in the case
of Buono v. Norton, where Congress recently passed a law requiring the
transfer of public property beneath an enjoined cross 30 2 but took various
steps to preserve the symbol prior to the adverse ruling,303 the Ninth
Circuit noted that "there is nothing in [the new statute] that prevents the
land from being otherwise returned to the government ....
At a minimum, this inquiry imposes on defendants an obligation to
sell property without reserving a right to reacquire the land. For
example, if government maintains a reversionary interest that is triggered
by the purchaser's alteration or removal of the religious display, the
terms of the sale itself memorialize government's vested right to
reacquire ownership for the purpose of continuing its unconstitutional
conduct. While this limitation may appear self-evident, similar
provisions have been included in recent transactions purporting to moot
the enforcement of injunctions barring the display of religious symbols
on public land.305
The second prong of the inquiry-whether "interim relief or events
have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged
violation" 3°6-subsumes within it the full set of issues relating to the
requirements of the Establishment Clause in the context of a remedial
sale, which are discussed separately below.
(2) Does a Sale Necessarily End State Action?
Defendants also assert that state action terminates whenever a
challenged religious symbol is transferred to private property,
irrespective of the terms of the transaction, based on the fact that the state
no longer exercises dominion over the display.30 7 Any disposition of
301. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1983).
302. Act of Sept. 30, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-87 § 8121, 117 Stat. 1054 (2003).
303. Consolidated Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 106-554 § 113, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (forbid-
ding expenditure of public funds to remove cross); Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-248 § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1519 (2002) (same); Department of Defense and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United
States, Pub. L. No. 107-117 § 8137, 115 Stat. 2230 (2002) (designating cross a national memorial).
304. Buono, 371 F.3d at 546; see, e.g., Appellees' Supplemental Brief at 4, Buono, 371 F.3d
543 (No. 03-55032) ("[There is] no reason to believe that Congress will not amend or repeal [the
statute mandating the sale], or otherwise attempt to return the cross to federal land, if the appeal and
the district court's judgment were dismissed.").
305. Buono, 371 F.3d at 545; Ex. 1 to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion to Modify and Enforce the Injunction, Murphy, 1997 WL 754604 (No. 90-0134-
GT).
306. Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1274.
307. See, e.g., City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491; Appellee City of San Diego's Supplemental
Brief, at *8 & n.8, Paulson, 294 F.3d 1124 (No. 00-55406), available at 2002 WL 32099877; Appel-
lee Council of Armenian American Organizations of Northern California's Response Brief, Kong,
2001 WL 1020102 (No. 00-15261), available at 2000 WL 33986165; Defendants' Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion to Modify and Enforce the Injunction at 6-10, Murphy, 1997 WL 754604 (No. 90-
0134-GT) ("There simply is no state action.").
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public property, however, is itself state action that must comport with the
requirements of the Constitution. 30 8  In at least two circumstances, the
structure of a remedial sale may perpetuate religious endorsement and
thus constitute impermissible state action, irrespective of the fact that it
privatizes the property in question: where government projects its actual
control over the property by dictating the terms of its private use, and
where a transaction is structured so that the privatized speech continues
to enjoy the apparent endorsement of the state.
Where government purports to remedy a constitutional violation by
transferring property with restrictions on its use, courts clearly retain the
ability to scrutinize the transaction for constitutional infirmity. The
principle was made plain in Evans v. Newton,309 where the Supreme
Court held that the transfer of segregated public parkland to a private
successor trustee for the continued operation of the property on a
discriminatory basis failed to terminate state action. 310  As Evans made
clear, state action does not dissipate when public land is transferred to a
private entity in a manner that perpetuates an unconstitutional use. The
same principle governed a number of cases barring various attempts by
municipalities to preserve racial discrimination through the privatization
of segregated public facilities. 3u' Thus in Hampton v. Jacksonville, the
Fifth Circuit held that the sale of property to private individuals on
condition that they continue to operate the land as a golf course was
insufficient to sever the city's involvement in racial discrimination at the
facility.312  Because the reversionary clause in the deed obligated the
purchasers to operate the land exactly as the city had before them, the
conduct of the new owners remained state action for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
313
The same state action analysis is applicable to efforts by
government to assure that private recipients of public land preserve
otherwise unconstitutional religious displays.3 t4  In Murphy v. Bilbray,
308. Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1010- 11 ("[Defendant] is correct that there is an important
difference between public speech and private speech and that there is no establishment clause viola-
tion without state action .... However, there is government action in this case: the City's sale of
property to [a private purchaser].").
309. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
310. Evans, 382 U.S. at 302.
311. United States v. Mississippi, 499 F.2d 425, 430-32 (5th Cir. 1974); Wright v. City of
Brighton, 441 F.2d 447, 451 (5th Cir. 1971); Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120, 123-24 (3d Cit.
1968); Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 1962).
312. Hampton, 304 F.2d at 323.
313. Id. at 322.
314. Cf Chambers, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 772. The typical objection to this argument is that race
discrimination is disfavored in both the private and public context, whereas private religious practice
is constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Responding Brief of the City of San Diego at 19, Paulson,
294 F.3d 1124 (00-55406) (argument constitutes an attempt "to equate . . . the free exercise of relig-
ion ... with the practice of racial discrimination"). However, the matter at issue is government's
preferential facilitation of a private sectarian message, which enjoys no constitutional favor. E.g.,
infra note 372; see Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 521 F.2d 344, 351 (5th Cir. 1975).
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for example, the defendants transferred a cross and a tiny plot of land
beneath it to a private organization following an adverse judgment in the
district court)' 5 The transfer was made at no cost to the recipient and on
condition that the cross be preserved; moreover, the government
indemnified the recipient for all costs associated with defending the
transfer and retained a reversionary interest permitting it to reacquire the
cross and underlying property in the event that a court struck down the
display in its new setting.3t6 On such facts, it is implausible to claim that
a transaction terminates state action with respect to a challenged religious
display, simply because title to the property is nominally transferred to a
private party.317  The Murphy defendants ultimately reached the same
conclusion and abandoned the transaction.
318
Even without projected control in the form of a deed restriction,
reversionary interest, or other limitation on the private recipient's use
and control of the property, a sale can still reflect apparent endorsement
-and thus constitute state action within the reach of the court's remedial
authority-simply by virtue of the perceived relationship of government
to the privatized display. While government defendants have cited the
plurality opinion in Pinette for the proposition that no endorsement
violation can arise from private religious expression, 319 only four
members of the Court embraced that position. 320 A majority of the Court
took the opposing view, articulated by Justice Souter in his concurring
opinion, that "[bly allowing government to encourage what it cannot do
on its own, the proposed per se rule [of the plurality] would tempt a
public body to contract out its establishment of religion, by encouraging
the private enterprise of the religious to exhibit what the government
could not display itself."'321  In the remedial context, this reasoning
requires scrutiny of any transaction that purports to privatize religious
expression to assure that the speech does not continue to imply state
endorsement of its message. Indeed, the rationale for applying such
scrutiny to the remedial sale of a permanent religious symbol is
significantly more compelling than in Pinette itself, where there was no
315. Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1528-29.
316. Exs. 1, 2, and 6 at 46, lines 10-15, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion to Modify and Enforce the Injunction, Murphy, 1997 WL 754604 (No. 90-0134-
GT).
317. Cf Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *9 (impermissible to conduct "a sale to a straw purchaser
that left the City with continuing power to exercise duties of ownership").
318. County's Brief in Response to Brief of the Attorney General at 2, 5, Murphy v. Bilbray,
Civ. No. 90-0134-GT (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1998) (order denying motion to appoint successor trustee).
319. See, e.g., City Appellee's Brief, Kong, 2001 WL 1020102 (No. 00-15261), available at
2000 WL 33986166.
320. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 757.
321. Id. at 792 (Souter, J., concurring); see Gey 11, supra note 19, at 428-29. This analysis is
echoed in recent rulings extending First Amendment speech analysis to formerly public property that
retains the character and appearance of a public forum. See, e.g., ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 333
F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2003); First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1131; Venetian Casino Resort,
L.L.C. v. Local Joint Exec. Bd., 257 F.3d 937, 941-43 (9th Cir. 2001).
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prior finding of endorsement and the private symbolic speech had been
temporarily erected in a public forum for unattended displays. 2
In City of Marshfield, the Seventh Circuit expressly embraced this
analysis:
Absent unusual circumstances, a sale of real property is an effective
way for a public body to end its inappropriate endorsement of
religion. We are aware, however, that adherence to a formalistic
standard invites manipulation. To avoid such manipulation, we look
to the substance of the transaction as well as its form to determine
whether government action endorsing religion has actually ceased.323
This inquiry, the court noted, must include scrutiny of the resulting
religious speech on private land insofar as "private speech which
reasonably may be understood to constitute a public endorsement of
religion" is at issue. 324 The Marshfield court concluded that the private
speech could indeed be imputed to government, based on the lack of
demarcation between the public and private parcels, and found an
Establishment Clause violation on that basis. 325  At least three other
courts have similarly rejected remedial sales on grounds that they failed
to dissipate the appearance of preference for private religious speech.326
The holding in each case properly reflects the premise that state action
for purposes of the endorsement inquiry does not end with a title transfer
but instead terminates only if the privatized message no longer enjoys the
apparent preference of government.
b. The Attributes of the Transferred Land: The Requirements
of Physical Separation
Any sale of public land beneath a religious display formally
separates the symbol from government. The relevant substantive
inquiry, however, is whether such separation succeeds in dispelling the
appearance that government endorses the religious speech. To satisfy
this requirement, the physical separation of government from a religious
322. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 757-59.
323. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491.
324. Id. at 494.
325. Id. at 494-95.
326. Paulson, 294 F.3d 1124; Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1009-19, and 276 F. Supp. 2d at
974-978; Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, at *9-*11; see also, Buono, 371 F.3d at 546 (court declines to
decide constitutionality of planned remedial sale but notes "that the presence of a religious symbol
on once-public land that has been transferred into private hands may still violate the Establishment
Clause"); cf Paulson, 262 F.3d at 896. Additionally, the court in Kong upheld a remedial sale after
reviewing it within the framework of City of Marshfield, suggesting acceptance of the premise that a
sale does not necessarily terminate state action and must independently survive Establishment
Clause scrutiny. Kong, 2001 WL 1020102, at *1.-*2. Finally, in reversing the district court decision
in Mercier, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed City of Marshfield in this respect and explicitly noted that
remedial transactions must be subject to independent scrutiny to assure that there are "no unusual
circumstances surrounding the sale ... so as to indicate an endorsement of religion." Mericer, 2005
WL 81886, at *9.
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display must be both evident and substantial. The former requirement
relates to the visible demarcation of public and private parcels; the latter
relates to the amount of land sold and its relationship to adjoining public
property, if any.
(1) Evident Separation
The purpose of every remedy in this context is to communicate to
the objective observer that government no longer endorses religious
expression. The first requirement of any remedial sale thus must be to
demonstrate the actual separation between government and an endorsed
display. It does little good to sell property underlying a religious symbol
if the change in ownership is apparent only to those who conduct a title
search. While the objective observer is deemed knowledgeable of the
ownership of property,327 that observer will also take note that
government has made no attempt to forthrightly manifest its separation
from a display. In the remedial context, the failure to differentiate public
and private parcels following a remedial sale reasonably suggests that
government is not fully committed to dissociating itself from endorsed
religious speech.32 8 As a result, courts reviewing remedial sales have
required in every case that public property be visibly demarcated from
the transferred land.329
Demarcation typically has two components: some type of physical
delineation of the transferred parcel coupled with signs that identify its
private ownership. Physical delineation can take the form of a fence, 330 a
series of bollards,33 1 or even a dense forest surrounding a transferred
clearing. 332 So long as the transition is evident to a reasonable observer,
the delineation requirement is met.333 The additional necessity of signs
or plaques identifying the ownership of transferred property reflects the
fact that government may fence off portions of its own land for a variety
of reasons, and thus that the delineation of a parcel does not necessarily
imply its private status. To make clear to a skeptical observer that
government has embraced the constitutional objectives of a remedial
327. Supra notes 97-98.
328. Cf. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 776 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In context, a disclaimer helps
remove doubt about state approval of respondents' religious message."); id. at 794 (Souter, J., con-
curring).
329. Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *10; Paulson, 262 F.3d at 895-96; Kong, 2001 WL 1020102,
at *1-*2; City of Marshfield, 2000 WL 767376, at *1; Paulson, Civ. No. 89-0820-GT, at 8 (S.D. Cal.
Feb. 3, 2000); cf Ciy of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 494-97 (remedial sale fails for lack of demarca-
tion).
330. City of Marshfield, 2000 WL 767376, at * 1.
331. Paulson, Civ. No. 89-0820-GT, at 7-8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2000).
332. Kong, 2001 WL 1020102, at *1-*2.
333. Cf City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497.
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sale, the private ownership of a transferred parcel should be stated
334unambiguously.
While all courts accept the necessity of demarcation in the context
of a remedial sale, some require little or nothing more. 33 5 As Justice
Souter made clear in Pinette, however, the endorsement analysis
demands further scrutiny. "Of course, the presence of a disclaimer does
not always remove the possibility that a private religious display
'convey[s] or attempt[s] to convey a message that religion or a particular
religious belief is favored or preferred,' when other indicia of
endorsement... outweigh the mitigating effect of the disclaimer .... ,,336
In Allegheny, for example, the Supreme Court held that a sign identifying
the private ownership of a creche in a county courthouse "simply
demonstrates that the government is endorsing the religious message of
that [private] organization, rather than communicating a message of its
own .... Indeed, the very concept of 'endorsement' conveys the sense
of promoting someone else's message." 337  With respect to property
transferred in a remedial sale, the additional inquiry bearing on the
appearance of endorsement relates to the size of the transferred plot and
its relationship to adjacent public land.
(2) Substantial Separation
Irrespective of the clarity of its demarcation, a transferred parcel
will fail to dissipate the appearance of endorsement if it does not also
create substantial separation between government and an impermissible
display. The necessity of this separate inquiry is illustrated by the
remedial sales conducted in the Murphy and Paulson cases after the
district court struck down the defendants' display of large crosses at the
apex of hilltop parks.338 The Paulson defendants purported to remedy
their violation by selling the 43-foot cross and a fifteen-foot square
parcel of land at its base to a private entity. In Murphy, the
defendants' transaction included a 36-foot cross and a 30-foot diameter
parcel of land beneath it. 34°  In both cases, the transferred plots were
surrounded by over 99% of the original public parkland.341 The district
court struck down the sale in Paulson on grounds, inter alia, that the plot
334. Paulson, 262 F.3d at 895-96; Kong, 2001 WL 1020102, at *1-*2; Paulson, Civ. No. 89-
0820-GT, at 8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2000); City of Marshfield, 2000 WL 767376, at *1.
335. Paulson, 262 F.3d at 895 (according determinative significance to "whether the distinc-
tion between the public and private area is clearly marked"); City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497;
Paulson, Civ. No. 89-0820-GT, at 7-8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2000); City of Marshfield, 2000 WL
767376, at *1.
336. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 794 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
337. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 600-01; see, e.g., Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1430-31.
338. Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1438.
339. Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1528; Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1422 n.2.
340. Id.
341. Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1528; Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1422 n.3.
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was too small to dissipate the appearance of preference.342 The court
observed that, given the tiny size of the parcel, "it is hard.. . to imagine
that any visitor to the Mt. Soledad hilltop and cross would not conclude
that the City was directly involved in the preservation and maintenance
of the Mt. Soledad cross." 343  Facing the same fate, the Murphy
defendants unwound the transfer and proposed a new transaction
involving a larger parcel. 3"
These are easy cases: the plots at issue were so slight, and the
nominally privatized religious symbols such an immense and dominating
presence over the immediately surrounding parkland, that no reasonable
observer would likely perceive the transactions as effectively separating
government from religious speech. As such, the sales illustrate the need
to assess the size and character of the transferred land; if demarcation
alone were sufficient, both transactions would have ended the inquiry
provided that the tiny parcels had been adequately bounded. The more
difficult task is to define the parameters of the analysis in closer cases
involving more substantial property transfers. In short, how much is
enough? This is necessarily a fact-bound question that turns on the
particular circumstances of each display and the court's subjective
perception of them. Since in almost all cases the size and configuration
of a transferred plot is uniquely related to the display at issue, there is no
comparative benchmark against which to assess its preferential effect.
Instead, the offense to the endorsement principle is the intrinsic
advantage conferred on a religious beneficiary by the intimate proximity
and relationship of its sectarian display to adjoining public land.345
Despite the irreducibly subjective nature of this determination, 34
there are several objective factors that should guide the inquiry.
Returning to the core concern of the endorsement prohibition-the
political disaffection of religious outsiders-any remedy should be
designed to restore the beneficial use of public property to persons for
whom its enjoyment has been burdened by the symbols of an alien
faith.347 To do so requires that public property adjoining a transferred
342. Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, at * 11.
343. Id.
344. County's Brief in Response to Brief of the Attorney General, at 2, 5, Murphy, Civ. No.
90-0134-GT (Sept. 28, 1998). This subsequent transaction was also struck down on grounds that the
larger parcel was still too small to dissipate the appearance of preference. Murphy, Civ. No. 90-
0134-GT (Sept. 28, 1998).
345. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text. It is important to stress that this
determination is made in the remedial context and thus rests on the knowledge that government
previously supplied the platform for the religious speech in question and had, in fact or appearance,
endorsed it. An objective observer would likely draw an entirely different and more benign
conclusion from government's close physical proximity to private religious speech in the absence of
this history of support and preference.
346. Id.
347. See Rabun, 698 F.2d at 1104-05. This determination, however, cannot be made from the
perspective of the religious minorities themselves, but instead from the vantage of the objective
observer. Pinene, 515 U.S. at 779-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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symbol be reasonably free of the dominating influence of the religious
display. If public property remains in the literal shadow of a transferred
symbol, for example, the objective observer will likely perceive that
government continues to communicate a disaffecting message of
endorsement to nonadherents. As Professor Gey has observed in a
related context:
[When private religious speech is] so dominant, so prominently
placed, or so persistent that it becomes a fixture of a public forum[,
it] not only coerces a dissenter in the Lee [v. Weisman] sense of
effectively forcing the dissenter out of the forum . . . but [it] also
indicates when the dissenter is likely to perceive the message that he
or she is not welcome as a full-fledged member of the political
community.
348
One analytic factor, then, is the size of a religious display in relation
to the amount of land transferred. A more substantial amount of property
must be sold to effectively separate government from a 100-foot cross
than to accomplish the same result with respect to an equivalently
situated 25-foot display. A second consideration is the character of the
surrounding public property. If the surrounding public space is open and
usable,349 rather than densely forested or inaccessible, 350 more land must
be transferred to achieve sufficient separation because a greater amount
of the adjacent public property will be perceptibly dominated by the
transferred display. Similarly, if the religious symbol sits at or near the
apex of the property, with open slopes descending away from the
display, it likely will appear to be the focal point of the literally inferior
surrounding property and thus exert an especially powerful and far-
reaching visual influence over the adjacent land. 351 A third consideration
is the relationship between the private symbol and any supporting
amenities or infrastructure remaining on adjoining public land. Where
the remaining public property supports the use and enjoyment of the
private religious display-for instance, by providing adjacent park
benches to facilitate its viewing or other amenities such as parking,
drinking fountains, trash receptacles, and the like-the efficacy of a
remedial sale is less compelling than in circumstances where the
transferred parcel is not dependent on the infrastructure of the
surrounding property.352
348. Gey I, supra note 19, at 444. Professor Gey proposes to measure this unconstitutional
effect by examining whether "a dissenter is likely to feel obliged to opt out of a forum to avoid
participating in a religious exercise." Id.
349. See, e.g., Jewish War Veterans, 695 F. Supp. at 5.
350. E.g., Kong, 2001 WL 1020102, at *1-*2.
351. E.g., Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1436.
352. See, e.g., Appellant's Excerpts of the Record, Ex. 6 at 82, 86, 87, and 93, and Ex. 7 at
102-04, 106-07, 109-13, and 115, Paulson, 294 F.3d 1124 (00-55406).
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While the analysis of these factors, alone and in combination, must
turn on the facts of each case and ultimately be governed by the
subjective sensibilities of the court itself, their application should be
guided by a practical assessment of the ability of nonadherents to use and
enjoy the remaining public land.353  In certain cases this inquiry may
substantially constrain government's remedial discretion. For example,
if public property cannot be subdivided in a way that effectively
separates some portion of the original land from the dominating presence
of a religious symbol, government's only alternative will be to sell the
entire parcel if it declines to remove the display.354
While a few courts have acknowledged the relevance of this
inquiry, 35 others have ignored it and sanctioned sales without regard to
the size and configuration of the transferred plot.356 Most notably, the
Seventh Circuit's decision in City of Marshfield accords exclusive
significance to demarcation and, in so doing, sanctions the transfer of a
small parcel of land at the center of a park to accommodate the continued
display of a large statue of Jesus Christ.357 While this failing may reflect
the limited objections asserted by plaintiffs in the case,358 the resulting
precedent directly conflicts with the remedial analysis proposed above.
City of Marshfield's narrow focus on demarcation-diluted further by its
conflation of the endorsement inquiry with the free speech and free
exercise rights of the private purchaser 359-yields an exceedingly faint
remedy: the court requires only that the defendant "construct some
defining structure, such as a permanent gated fence or wall, to separate
City property from [the private] property accompanied by a clearly
visible disclaimer .... ,360 On remand, this directive resulted in an order
imposing a "minimal enclosure" comprised of a four-foot high wrought-
iron fence surrounding the private plot. 36' The 15-foot marble statue thus
353. Cf supra note 348.
354. Murphy, Civ. No. 90-0134-GT, at 6 (Sept. 28, 1998) ("With the proposed split [of the Mt.
Helix park], the presence of the cross still overshadows the amphitheatre, which would be entrusted
to the County .... In this Court's view, the [transfer of] the entire property ... would cure the
constitutional infirmities."); cf Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1011 ("If the City had sold the entire to
park to the Order, there would be a stronger argument that the City had 'divorce[d] itself from the
religious content' of the monument.").
355. Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1011, 1019; Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, at *11; Murphy, Civ.
No. 90-0134-GT, at 6 (Sept. 28, 1998).
356. Paulson, 262 F.3d at 895-96; City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497; City of Marshfield,
2000 WL 767376, at *1.
357. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497,
358. Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1018 (describing the limited objections offered by plaintiffs in
City of Marshfield).
359. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
360. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497.
361. City of Marshfield, 2000 WL 767376, at *1. Plaintiffs alternative proposal-the con-
struction of a ten-foot high masonry wall-was rejected by the district court as too restrictive of the
private purchaser's speech interests. Id. The district court's ruling in this regard was appropriate:
the demarcation requirement should be understood to require only that public and private property be
clearly delineated, not that private speech be shrouded. The flaw in the City of Marshfield analysis,
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stands exactly as it did prior to the litigation but for its fenced .15 acre
enclosure, surrounded on all sides by public parkland and sidewalks.36 2
Whether or not the court would have required more aggressive remedial
measures had it engaged in the broader analysis proposed above, its
singular focus on demarcation invites lower courts to authorize
transactions, as in Murphy and Paulson, which offend rather than affirm
the endorsement doctrine.
Any doubt regarding the risk posed by the Marshfield precedent
was resolved by the Seventh Circuit's recent opinion in Mercier. Noting
that the remedial sale at issue essentially mirrored the transaction upheld
in Marshfield,363 the majority in Mercier authorized the sale of a 20-by-
22-foot parcel of parkland underlying a religious monument without
addressing any concern regarding the size of the transferred plot.
364
Writing for the majority, Judge Manion suggests instead that the sale of
such a "tiny share of the public domain ' 36s is actually preferable to a
more substantial land transfer:
By selling the parcel around the Monument, the City has not sud-
denly deprived the visitors to the Park of normal access and enjoy-
ment. Visitors to the Park remain free to utilize the park grounds,
much the same way as before the sale. Other than the twenty by
twenty-two-foot-space fenced around the Monument, which has oc-
cupied the space for forty years, access to the Park is not limited by
the now-private parcel.
366
By deeming it a virtue that park visitors will experience essentially
no change in their use of the public space, the Mercier court turns the
remedial inquiry on its head: the obvious objective of meaningful relief
is not to preserve the status quo but rather to alter it in some appreciable
respect. In particular, the "visitors" with whom the endorsement prohibi-
tion is concerned are not those identified by Judge Manion, who "remain
free to utilize the park grounds, much the same way as before the sale."
They are, instead, the religious nonadherents whose "normal access [to]
and enjoyment" of the park was constrained in the first instance by the
constitutional violation, and whose present use of the park property may
well be burdened in a nearly identical fashion by the immediately adja-
instead, is its failure to separately consider the endorsement implications of the size and configura-
tion of the transferred plot.
362. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 489-90; City of Marshfield, 2000 WL 767376, at *1.
363. E.g., Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *7 ("Recall that the fencing and signs installed by [the
defendant] is [sic] identical (even to the point of having the same-size lettering) to that ordered by
the district court in Marshfield."); see also id. at *6, *8.
364. Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *3. The circuit court ignored the question despite the fact
that the lower court had expressly addressed it. See Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1011, 1019.
365. Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at * 12 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
366. Id. at *9.
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cent religious display. Any remedy that ignores this foundational
distinction will likely perpetuate rather than resolve the constitutional
transgression.
c. The Method of Sale: The Requirements of Neutrality
In addition to achieving evident and substantial physical separation,
a remedial sale must accomplish that objective through means that are
strictly neutral with respect to the religious expression at issue. A
number of recent transactions purporting to remedy impermissible
displays contain terms that transgress this requirement.
(1) Viewpoint Neutrality and the Prohibition Against
Express Religious Preference
In selling public property to remedy the unconstitutional display of
a religious symbol, government allocates an exclusive and permanent
right of access to land that is primarily, if not singularly, of value as a
venue for expressive activity. While the end result of a permissible
transaction is a private parcel free of constitutional constraints, the sale
itself is state action regulating the use and disposition of public
property.367 As a practical matter, it is beyond dispute that a remedial
sale regulates speech activity by allocating among competing viewpoints
an exclusive right of access to a valuable (and in some instances a
premier) 368 platform for speech. In so doing, government must comply
with the fundamental neutrality requirements imposed by both the Free
Speech and Establishment Clauses. As a matter of free speech, it is a
bedrock principle that government may not engage in viewpoint
discrimination.3 69  As a matter of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,
favoring sectarian speech violates the endorsement prohibition. 70 In this
regard, the requirements of the two constitutional commands largely
correspond.37'
These neutrality rules impose clear requirements on the structure of
a remedial sale. First and most fundamentally, government may not
transfer property on condition that the recipient embrace the viewpoint of
the endorsed display.372 Similarly, a viewpoint restriction that favors a
367. See supra notes 269, 307-26.
368. E.g., Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1422.
369. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985); SMOLLA,
supra note 269, § 2:12 ("Thus, the Court has erected what is essentially an absolute bar against
'viewpoint discrimination ....'"); see supra note 269.
370. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 766.
371. Id.; Am. Jewish Cong., 90 F.3d at 384-85.
372. See, e.g., Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, at *11 ("[T]he exclusion of any other purchasers of
or bidders for the land ... gives the appearance of preferring the Christian religion over all others.").
If the selected recipient clearly acquiesces in the symbolic expression, it should make no difference
whether the express terms of a negotiated transaction formally require the purchaser to preserve the
display-the outcome is obvious in either case. Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1014 ("It was a surprise
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broader spectrum of religious expression is equally indefensible-for
example, a requirement that the purchaser either maintain the existing
display or erect an alternative sectarian symbol in its place.373 Finally, a
restriction on the property that permits the purchaser to retain or remove
the existing display but prohibits the erection of any competing symbolic
speech374 discriminates in the same manner, since the only viewpoint that
can possibly be communicated from the transferred land is the one
expressed by the original display.
No doubt the public will be troubled, at least in certain
circumstances, by a remedy that prohibits defendants from engaging in
viewpoint discrimination with respect to the use of transferred property.
It is not likely a popular proposition to suggest that government, in
implementing a war-memorial use restriction on property underlying a
hilltop cross,375 must permit the removal of the symbol and the erection
of a competing monument castigating all war as sinful. If government
wishes to exercise such expressive control, however, it may easily do so
(and without selling its own property) provided that it does not endorse a
sectarian symbol in the process. Government's impetus in conducting a
remedial sale is not to secure a war memorial that meets the expectations
of the general public, for example, but instead to extricate itself from the
endorsement of symbolic religious speech. If the former rather than the
latter were at issue, the land would not be sold in the first instance and
government could develop the property on its own terms without
constitutional concern.376 Once government chooses to remedy an
endorsement violation by selling property beneath a religious symbol,
however, it necessarily relinquishes its right to control the viewpoint
communicated from the transferred land.377
to no one when the Order chose to keep the monument in its present location."); Murphy, 1997 WL
754604, at *11; cf Mississippi, 499 F.2d at 430-32; Wright, 441 F.2d at 451.
373. Cf Wallace, 472 U.S. at 54 ("[Tlhe political interest in forestalling intolerance extends
beyond intolerance among Christian sects-or even intolerance among 'religions'-to encompass
intolerance of the disbeliever and the uncertain."); Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495.
374. See Hall, supra note 264, at B 1 (recounting proposed remedial sale on such terms).
375. Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1127-28.
376. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234-35 (2000).
377. Some defendants have challenged this neutrality requirement by claiming that endorsed
displays are historically significant and thus that their preservation promotes a secular and view-
point-neutral goal. E.g., Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Modify and Enforce the
Injunction at 16, Murphy, 1997 WL 754604 (No. 90-0134-GT). At least one court appears to have
embraced the argument. Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *9 (concluding that the defendant "had an
historical reason" for selling religious monument and underlying public property to a purchaser
committed to preserving display, based on the fact that the monument purportedly commemorated
efforts by local youth to protect city from a 1965 flood); cf supra notes 142-63 and accompanying
text. The argument overlooks the fact that the identical assertion would have been dispositive of the
preceding liability determination: if a religious display is sufficiently historical to render its preser-
vation a secular objective in remedial litigation, then the symbol must be sufficiently historical to
remain on public land in the first instance. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text. Indeed,
because greater scrutiny should be applied to government action in the remedial context, supra notes
202-21 and accompanying text, it is more likely that the historical preservation claim will prevail at
the liability stage.
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To accomplish a sale on non-preferential terms, government may
auction the property to the highest bidder,378 hold a drawing among pro-
spective purchasers, 379 or otherwise transfer the property based on the
objective application of viewpoint-neutral criteria. In virtually all in-
stances, the sale of public land will be governed in part by state and local
law. 380 While any sale must comply with such provisions to the extent
that they do not conflict with remedial requirements, the fact that a pro-
cedure is authorized as a matter of local law does not answer the consti-
tutional inquiry. In two recent cases, for example, courts have authorized
viewpoint-biased remedial sales based predominantly on the conclusion
that the transactions complied with state law.381 Those remedial trans-
fers, however, were fundamentally different than nearly any other land
sale: the subject properties were traditional public fora, sold to remedy
the defendants' endorsement of religious speech, and purchased for the
382sole purpose of perpetuating a religious message. On such facts, a
land transfer cannot be governed solely by standards applicable to the
sale of vacant lots. 383
While a prohibition against viewpoint bias in remedial transactions
may not seem a particularly controversial proposition, several reported
cases-including Buono,3  City of Marshfield,3 85  Paulson,386 and
Mercier387-involve negotiated sales with recipients who were commit-
ted to preserving the religious symbol.388 In Paulson, and before the
district court in Mercier, the infirmity was deemed fatal. 389 As the lower
court in Mercier noted:
The City has neither allowed any other group to express a message in
the park (at least permanently) nor established a neutral program to
determine which groups may purchase a portion of the land to ex-
press their messages. Instead, the Common Council passed a "spe-
378. Tonkins v. City of Greensboro, 276 F.2d 890, 891-92 (4th Cir. 1960) (upholding remedial
transaction where a segregated public pool was "sold at public auction to the high bidder"); see also
Woodland Hills Homeowners Org. v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 266 Cal. Rptr. 767, 775-76
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (lease of surplus school property to religious organization did not violate Cali-
fornia Constitution, where lease resulted from open bidding); cf. Mississippi, 499 F.2d at 432;
Hampton, 304 F.2d at 323.
379. Cf. Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1021 ("Perhaps the most neutral method of ending the
City's endorsement would be to hold a public auction for the monument or give the monument away
through a drawing.").
380. See City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492; Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, at *7-*8; see, e.g.,
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 25520-25535 (West 2004).
381. Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *9; City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492-93.
382. E.g., City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d. at 489-90.
383. Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, at *7-*8, * 11.
384. Buono, 371 F.3d at 545.
385. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 489-90.
386. Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1126; Murphy, 1997 WL 754604, at * 11.
387. Mercier, 305 F. Supp 2d at 1012.
388. See also supra note 287.
389. Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1012; Murphy, 1997 WL 754604 *11.
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cial and unusual" act [authorizing the sale of a parcel of public park-
land] to aid the promotion of one religious message.
3 90
By contrast, the Seventh Circuit in City of Marshfield did not even
address the fundamental bias in the transaction before it and thus impli-
edly sanctioned the preference.391 Of considerably greater concern, the
same circuit recently reversed the district court in Mercier and expressly
sanctioned a viewpoint-biased transaction with the cursory observation
that the objection was foreclosed by the holding in Marshfield.392  By
elevating Marshfield's silent acquiescence in a viewpoint-biased reme-
dial sale to the status of controlling precedent, and by declining to assess
or even acknowledge the lower court's contrary analysis,393 the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Mercier exemplifies the risk posed by judicial indif-
ference (or antipathy) toward the vigorous remediation of endorsed reli-
gious speech. In the words of the Mercier dissent, the remedy authorized
by the majority opinion "borders on a fraud., 39 4 If embraced by other
courts, the perfunctory analysis giving rise to that outcome could sub-
stantially eviscerate the endorsement prohibition in this context.
(2) Structural Neutrality and the Prohibition Against
Preferential Effects
Presuming that government transfers property with no express pref-
erence for a particular religious viewpoint, the structure of the transac-
tion may still comparatively benefit prospective purchasers seeking to
preserve the symbol. These preferential effects should be impermissible
as well-at least in the remedial context, where the objective observer
will scrutinize any sale to assure that it is strictly neutral with respect to
endorsed speech. Structural preferences can take at least two forms.
First, viewpoint-neutral content restrictions on the expressive use of
transferred property may increase the likelihood that the endorsed dis-
play will remain. Second, facially neutral requirements regarding the
development of transferred property may differentially burden bidders in
ways that work to the advantage of those seeking to retain the display.
390. Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (citations omitted).
391. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492-93.
392. Mercier, 2005 WL 81886. at *9 ("Although Appellees point to the fact that the land was
offered solely to the Eagles, that was also true in Marshfield, where the City of Marshfield did not
solicit alternative bids for the statue."); see also id. at *8 ("The desire to keep the Monument in place
cannot automatically be labeled a constitutional violation .... The court in Marshfield approved the
sale when removal was an obvious option, so the Appellees' complaint ... is contrary to the holding
in Marshfield.").
393. Supra note 390.
394. Mercier, 2005 WL 81886, at *12 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
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(a) Preferential Content Restrictions
Unlike viewpoint discrimination, which is impermissible in almost
all settings, viewpoint-neutral content discrimination 395 -while still
highly disfavored-is permissible under a wider range of circumstances,
largely depending on the forum-designation of the property in
396question. 6 For example, requiring that transferred property be used as a
war memorial may be a permissible content regulation provided that it is
viewpoint-neutral.397 However, restricting the content of expression on
transferred property in a way that facilitates the preservation of the
existing display must be subject to special scrutiny to assure that the sale
satisfies the neutrality requirements of the Establishment Clause.
The risk of apparent endorsement corresponds to how narrowly a
facilitating content restriction has been drawn. As less and less
alternative speech is permitted, the probability of preserving an endorsed
display likely will increase. For example, any content restriction that
limits expression on transferred property to the topic of religion, even if
that restriction is viewpoint neutral, must be scrutinized closely for
preferential effect--e.g., by considering whether, in the context of a
particular case, the restriction so narrows the field of potential purchasers
that those interested in preserving the display are clearly advantaged.398
Similarly, a war-memorial use restriction placed on transferred
property 399 often will not merely facilitate the continued display of a
challenged symbol but virtually restate the government's characterization
of the display itself.40 Such an exceedingly narrow and perfectly
tailored content restriction creates a very high risk, in both fact and
appearance, that government is merely seeking to achieve indirectly what
it no longer may accomplish openly. By contrast, broader restrictions,
such as limiting the use of property to "open space" or "public park"
purposes, permit a greater range of competing viewpoints and thus pose
far less of an endorsement risk.4° l
395. Amato v. Wilentz, 753 F. Supp. 543, 553 (D.N.J. 1990) ("Content refers to the topic or
matter treated in a particular work. Viewpoint refers to one's opinion, judgment or position on that
topic.").
396. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45-47 (1983); Cornelius,
473 U.S. at 806.
397. Cf. Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1132 ("Here, the City sought to sell the land atop Mt. Soledad for
the undeniably appropriate secular purpose of ensuring the presence of a war memorial on the site.").
398. Government would also have to articulate a sufficiently compelling rationale for such a
content-restriction that itself reflects no religious preference; the mere hope of preserving the exist-
ing display in its present location is not adequate. Supra notes 268-71 and accompanying text.
399. See Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1127-28.
400. Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1527-28; Murphy, 782 F. Supp. at 1437-38; see, e.g., Separation of
Church & State Comm., 93 F.3d at 619-20; Jewish War Veterans, 695 F. Supp. at 14-15; Eckels, 589
F. Supp. at 233-35.




The endorsing effect of any content restriction will turn on the
specific facts of the proposal, its articulated rationale, the historical and
factual context of the display at issue, and-once again-the subjective
sensibilities of the reviewing court. Unlike viewpoint discrimination,
which unambiguously advances the interest of one religious viewpoint
over others and thus can be comparatively assessed, the endorsing effect
of a facilitating content restriction cannot be determined by objective
comparison alone. Because at least some competing speech will enjoy
formally equal access, the court must make a subjective determination
whether the use of such "formally neutral criteria ''4 2 effectively favors
the endorsed display.4 3
The scant decisional law addressing this issue ignores its
significance. The only court yet to consider the question-the original
three-judge panel in Paulson-dismissed concerns regarding the
endorsing effect of a facilitating war-memorial use restriction on grounds
that the city permitted the participation of bidders who did not intend to
preserve the cross. 404 The fact that government does not expressly limit a
transaction to purchasers committed to preserving a symbol (and thus
does not engage in viewpoint discrimination), however, does not end the
inquiry. As Justice O'Connor stressed in Pinette, the endorsement test
requires that courts look beyond "the application of formally neutral
criteria" to ascertain more subtle preferential effects.4 °5 The Paulson
panel also cited the Seventh Circuit's opinion in City of Marshfield in
support of its analysis, 46 yet that decision addressed the propriety of a
regulation permitting the use of transferred property for "public park
purposes" and thus had no occasion to assess the permissibility of a
content restriction that narrowly facilitates religious speech. 407  By
sanctioning the use of a narrow content restriction without any
meaningful scrutiny of its endorsing effect, the panel decision in Paulson
set virtually no limits on a remedial tactic that may significantly promote
endorsed religious expression.4°8
402. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 777 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
403. Once the court assures that a transaction does not in fact or appearance continue to pro-
mote religious speech, the remedial requirements of the Establishment Clause are met. The remain-
ing questions regarding the permissibility of viewpoint-neutral content regulations in the context of a
remedial sale turn on principles arising under the Free Speech Clause-e g., the forum-designation
of the property at issue, the resulting standard of review, and the adequacy of government's articu-
lated purpose in imposing a particular restriction.
404. Paulson, 262 F.3d at 892.
405. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
406. Paulson, 262 F.3d at 892.
407. Ciry of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 490.
408. The endorsing effect of the content restriction considered in Paulson was exacerbated by
the defendant's decision to assess, as part of its selection process, each bidder's expertise in main-
taining war memorials. Appellant's Excerpts of the Record, Ex. 3 at 2, t 2-3, Paulson, 294 F.3d
1124 (No. 00-55406). This criterion significantly benefited the defendant's favored purchaser-an
organization that originally constructed the cross and had maintained it for the preceding half cen-
tury. Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1125-26. Because the number of other private entities with expertise in
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(b) Special Burdens Imposed on Competing Viewpoints
Another way in which the structure of a remedial sale may promote
endorsed religious expression is by imposing facially neutral obligations
regarding the development of the property that place a special burden on
purchasers intending to remove the display. As discussed previously, the
sale struck down by the en banc court in Paulson had this effect. 409 By
requiring that all purchasers maintain a war memorial, and by stipulating
that the existing cross would satisfy the use restriction, the transaction
imposed a unique burden on bidders seeking to display a non-Christian
memorial: they alone would be required to incur the substantial expense
of removing the cross and constructing an alternative memorial in its
place.4 10  This requirement gave purchasers seeking to preserve the
display an objective advantage, since they were not required to reserve
funds for construction and thus could submit a comparatively higher
bid.41' This preferential effect would not be difficult to remedy. If the
defendant offered to deliver the property with or without the religious
symbol, at the buyer's direction, and additionally offered any purchaser a
set amount of financial assistance to be used in the buyer's discretion to
either construct a new war memorial or improve the existing one, no
bidder would be comparatively disfavored.
The preferential effect highlighted in Paulson is present even where
no affirmative development duty is imposed, to the extent that purchasers
opposed to an existing religious symbol must pay for its removal before
erecting an alternative display. In virtually any remedial sale where
property is transferred "as is," the transaction will thus disadvantage
bidders intending to use the property for competing expression.
However, there is a notable difference between the two scenarios. In the
former, government requires as a condition of purchase that bidders
agree to develop the property in a way that materially disadvantages
those opposed to the existing display. In the latter case, no bidder is
required by government to do anything with the property or to spend any
additional funds after its purchase. While competing speech is still
burdened, since only those purchasers opposed to the existing symbol
face the additional expense of its removal, government does not
coercively effectuate that bias by requiring the expenditure as a condition
of sale.
the arcane task of memorial maintenance is likely minute, this sale term effectively emptied the
universe of qualified competitors. The original three-judge panel dismissed this preferential effect
on grounds that, if the war-memorial use restriction itself was permissible, it was rational for the
defendant to seek purchasers with expertise in that undertaking. Paulson, 262 F.3d at 892-93. With
the gloss of this "expertise" inquiry, then, a facially neutral war-memorial use restriction was trans-
formed into a powerful mechanism to bias the sale in favor of preserving an endorsed display. Id.
409. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
410. Id.; Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1132-33.
411. Id.
412. E.g., Kong, 2001 WL 1020102, at *1-*2.
[Vol. 82:2
CROSS PURPOSES
Despite the absence of explicit coercion, however, any sale
structured in this way still offends the neutrality principle. By requiring
purchasers to accept property with an affixed sectarian display,
government forces those opposed to the display to either acquiesce in
symbolic speech with which they disagree or to incur the expense of
removing the fixture. Both options place these purchasers at a
comparative disadvantage in promoting their own expressive agenda,
since they can only obtain the property on equal financial terms if they
agree to communicate a competitor's message. As a result, government
should be required to deliver the property with or without the religious
symbol, at the buyer's direction. In addition to eliminating a significant
preferential effect, this arrangement advances government's interest in
assuring that the symbols of private faith are treated with care and
respect. Rather than risk that a private purchaser will destroy a display in
a provocative fashion, government can remove the symbol in a dignified
manner and, if possible, preserve it for sale or transfer to a private
entity."'
While government thus should be required to remove a symbol if
the purchaser so directs, it should not be obliged to fund the construction
of an alternative display. While this, too, is a cost that purchasers
intending to preserve the symbol may avert, it is not one that must be
offset to affirm the neutrality interests at stake. Here, all purchasers
receive the property in a condition that does not offend any expressive
interest; it is delivered either with no expressive symbol or with a display
that the purchaser has sought to preserve. The purpose of the neutrality
requirement is not to equalize perfectly the size, grandeur, and economic
value of all private symbolic speech that may be communicated from a
transferred parcel, but instead to eliminate government's influence over
the prevailing private viewpoint. By agreeing to remove an unwanted
religious fixture from transferred land, government accomplishes that
objective.
(3) Procedural Transparency and the Prohibition Against
Reserved Discretion
In addition to these substantive neutrality requirements, a
permissible sale must be structured to assure that selection criteria are
applied in a fair, consistent, and objectively verifiable fashion. This
requirement, rooted both in free speech and endorsement principles,414
condemns any effort by government to retain significant discretion in
determining the prevailing bidder-for example, by reserving the right to
accept or deny bids without cause415 or to rank purchase offers based on
unreviewable judgments regarding the aesthetic merit of competing plans
413. See supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
414. Am. Jewish Cong., 90 F.3d at 385; cf supra note 269.
415. See infra note 420.
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to develop the property.416 The only courts to consider such retained
discretion in the context of a remedial sale, however, have dismissed
these concerns and sanctioned the practice.
Among the basic principles governing the regulation of expressive
417activity is the requirement of clear and neutral rules. Whenever a
policy "allows for arbitrary application, it is not a valid time, place, and
manner regulation . . . . In the Establishment Clause context, such a
regulation also has the potential for impermissibly favoring a particular
religious viewpoint. ' 4 18 Reserving discretion to accept or reject purchase
offers without cause thus conflicts with core obligations imposed by both
the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.4 9
In the recent remedial sales at issue in Kong and Paulson, however,
government defendants expressly reserved such authority in their bid
invitations. 420 The Ninth Circuit in Kong ignored the objection and
upheld the sale of the Mt. Davidson cross without addressing plaintiffs
argument. 42 1 In Paulson, both the district court and the original three-
judge panel of the Ninth Circuit considered and rejected the objection.422
The panel decision in Paulson articulated three rationales for its
decision. First, the court characterized the constitutional principle as
applicable only in instances where a regulatory scheme contains no
standards whatsoever, and noted that "[s]uch truly absolute discretion
without any standards is clearly distinguished from the city council's
discretion here.' 423 Whether no criteria or hundreds are set forth,
however, a blanket reservation of discretion permitting the decision-
maker to disregard any or all of them should condemn the entire process.
Indeed, in City of Lakewood, the Supreme Court struck down a
regulatory scheme that contained numerous criteria on grounds that the
ordinance additionally reserved to the mayor discretion to impose "any
'other terms and conditions deemed necessary and reasonable .... 24
As the Court stated, such a scheme is subject to challenge so long as it
416. E.g., Appellee's Supplemental Excerpts of the Record, Ex. D at 29, Paulson, 294 F.3d
1124 (No. 00-55406); cf Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2001).
417. Am. Jewish Cong., 90 F.3d at 384.
418. Id. at 385.
419. See, e.g., Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-59 (1988); Rosenbaum
v. City San Francisco, No. 00-15147, 2001 WL 406963, at *2-*3 (9th Cit. Apr. 19, 2001); United
States v. Linick, 195 F.3d 538, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1999); Am. Jewish Cong., 90 F.3d at 384-86; Tokaji,
supra note 176, at 2441-44.
420. See Paulson, 262 F.3d at 893; Appellants' Opening Brief, Kong, 2001 WL 1020102 (No.
00-15261), available at 2000 WL 33986167; City Appellee's Brief, Kong, 2001 WL 1020102 (No.
00-15261), available at 2000 WL 33986166.
421. Kong, 2001 WL 1020102, at* 1-*2.
422. Paulson, 262 F.3d at 893; Paulson, Civ. No. 89-0820-GT, at 7 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2000).
The en banc panel that subsequently struck down the remedial sale did so on other grounds and thus
did not consider the question. Paulson, 294 F.3d at 1133 n.7.
423. Paulson, 262 F.3d at 893.
424. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 754 & n.2; see Plain Dealer Publ'g Co. v. City of Lake-
wood, 794 F.2d 1139, 1141 (6th Cir. 1986) (text of ordinance).
[Vol. 82:2
CROSS PURPOSES
"gives a government official or agency substantial power to discriminate
based on the content or viewpoint of speech. '' 25 The complete discretion
reserved by the bid solicitations in Kong and Paulson indisputably gave
the defendants such power.
The panel next excused the reserved discretion on grounds that it
appears in all of the government's bid invitations for the sale of real
property. 26 As discussed previously, however, remedial sales regulate
expressive activity as their primary, if not singular, objective, and thus
are unlike nearly any other real estate transaction.427  In such
circumstances, the foundational requirements of neutrality and clear rules
cannot be waived in favor of discretionary procedures used when selling
surplus lots. Likewise, the panel's suggestion that this fact demonstrated
government's non-censorial motivation fails to address the constitutional
428objection. Irrespective of whether discretion is exercised in good faith,the First Amendment still prohibits its reservation.429
Finally, the Paulson panel concluded that the reserved discretion
was justified by "the result of the process," which it claimed was
"consistent with the evaluated factors., '4 3 0 This analysis conflicts with
settled authority instructing that discretionary regulatory schemes should
be assessed without regard to outcome, precisely because "post hoc
rationalizations by the licensing official and the use of shifting or
illegitimate criteria are far too easy, making it difficult for courts to
determine in any particular case whether the licensor is permitting
favorable, and suppressing unfavorable, expression.",43 1 Thus the court in
American Jewish Congress struck down the regulatory decision at issue
without "determin[ing] the City's actual motivation in ruling on the
applications or the extent to which its determinations were based on
impermissible factors," because the discretionary scheme itself
condemned the outcome for purposes of the Establishment Clause.432
Justifications based on "the result of the process" also ignore the
potential chilling effect of retained discretion, which may deter other
bidders from even participating in a transaction and offering superior
terms.
433
425. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759 (emphasis added).
426. Paulson, 262 F.3d at 893.
427. Supra notes 367-71 and accompanying text; see City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759 (re-
quiring clear and definite standards where law has "a close enough nexus to expression ... to pose a
real and substantial threat of the identified censorship risks").
428. Paulson, 262 F.3d at 893.
429. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757; Serv. Employee Int'l Union vs. City of Los Angeles,
114 F. Supp. 2d 966,974 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
430. Paulson, 262 F.3d at 893.
431. City ofLakewood, 486 U.S. at 758; see Tokaji, supra note 176, at 2442.
432. Am. Jewish Cong., 90 F.3d at 385-86.
433. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757 ("[Tlhe mere existence of the licensor's unfettered
discretion, coupled with the power of prior restraint, intimidates parties into censoring their own
speech .... ).
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It is exceedingly difficult in the typical case to determine whether
reserved discretion has chilled the involvement of other participants or
whether the defendant has utilized its power to select a purchaser based
on impermissible considerations. Precisely because objective judicial
review is nearly impossible, any sale containing such terms should be
struck down under the Free Speech Clause.4 34 With respect to the
endorsement inquiry, reserved discretion forecloses any objective
determination that religious preference played no role in the bid selection
and thus underscores the appearance that the sale was designed to
perpetuate endorsed religious speech.
The foregoing argument extends the logic of the endorsement
standard described in Part I to the remediation of the constitutional
violations discussed in Part II. The premise of the analysis is that the
objective observer not only must discern the constitutional violation but
also must arbitrate its remedy. Framing the remedial analysis from the
vantage of an essentially omniscient observer yields important insights.
Perceiving that government has subjectively endorsed a religious
message, the observer will skeptically assess any proposed remedy to
assure that it does not perpetuate government's established religious
preference. To survive such scrutiny and cure the disaffecting injury
inflicted on nonadherents by the display of sectarian symbols, a remedial
measure must accomplish two interrelated objectives: it must create
evident and substantial physical separation between government and the
display, either through removal of the symbol or sale of a sufficiently
substantial parcel of land underlying it; and it must do so through means
that are strictly neutral with respect to the religious message itself. As
set forth above, the courts that have considered this remedial question
have not yet developed a coherent jurisprudence that effectuates the
endorsement doctrine-and, in several instances, have sanctioned
remedies that directly conflict with its reasoning.
CONCLUSION
Describing a phenomenon that he calls the "remedial
substantiation ' 4335 of constitutional rights, Professor Levinson observes
that "the cash value of a right is often nothing more than what the courts
. . . will do if the right is violated. Consequently, rights can be
effectively enlarged, abridged, or eviscerated by expanding, contracting,
or eliminating remedies. ' '436 By failing to reconcile the constitutional
proscription with its remedial consequences, the discordant analysis of
434. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969) (licensing scheme uncon-
stitutional "without narrow, objective, and definite standards").
435. Levinson, supra note 176, at 904-11.
436. Id. at 887.
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right and remedy described in this Article threatens to abridge the
constitutional prohibition against permanent religious displays on public
land and, in so doing, erode the legitimacy of constitutional adjudication
in this regard.
On one hand, application of the endorsement standard to the
question of constitutional liability has produced a coherent and well-
developed body of decisional law that unambiguously condemns the
permanent display of religious imagery in all but a handful of
circumstances. These cases recognize the unremarkable fact that the
permanent integration of a religious message with the physical presence
of government itself will likely communicate to nonadherents that they
are political outsiders, in derogation of the core value protected by the
endorsement test.
By contrast, the remedial treatment of these violations is a
haphazard affair reflecting little or no effort to ground the inquiry in the
endorsement principles that define the right itself. Removal of an
offending symbol, which was the simple and indisputably effective
remedy in the typical case for many years, is increasingly bypassed in
favor of more elaborate proposals designed to avert the necessity of
displacing an unconstitutional display. These new remedies raise
important questions that the federal courts have yet to satisfactorily
address. The most troubling of the proposals-and the increasing
number of decisions sanctioning them-trivialize rather than substantiate
the constitutional right. By suggesting that litigation in this area is a
rhetorical exercise with scant consequences, these outcomes ironically
enhance the effect that the endorsement doctrine exists to preclude: the
political alienation of religious outsiders.
The framework proposed in this Article realigns the remedial
analysis with the judiciary's rigorous and consistent assessment of the
proscription itself. By tethering the inquiry to the perceptions of Justice
O'Connor's observer, the proposal seeks to vindicate the constitutional
right as a fully effectuated restraint on the use of civic space as a
permanent platform for symbolic religious expression.
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